“YARARLI” ve “ZARARLI” GLOBAL KAMUSAL MALLAR ve ULUSLARARASI POLİTİK İKTİSADIN İKİ KÖR BIÇAĞI: GLOBAL REGÜLASYON ve GLOBAL VERGİLEME Kamu Tercihi Perspektifinden Uluslararası Organizasyonların Başarısızlığı

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 2, 132 - 157, 31.12.2022

Coşkun Can Aktan

https://doi.org/10.55827/ebd.1100703

Öz

Günümüzde global kamusal malların pozitif etkileri ve global kamusal kötülüklerin negatif etkileri öylesine önemli boyutlara ulaşmıştır ki, hiçbir ülkenin bu iyiliklere ve/veya kötülüklere kayıtsız kalması düşünülemez. Ulus devletlerin tek başına global sorunları çözüme kavuşturmaları mümkün olmadığından sorunun çözümü uluslararası organizasyonların global anarşizmden kurtulabilmek için ortak işbirliği yapmalarına bağlı bulunmaktadır. Ancak kamu tercihi perspektifi tıpkı ulus devletler gibi uluslararası organizasyonların da başarısızlığa uğramasının kaçınılmaz olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Kamu tericihi araştırma proğramı uluslararası politik iktisadın iki kör bıçağının (global regülasyon ve global vergileme) sorunun çözümünü güçleştirdiğini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

GLOBAL KAMUSAL MALLAR, ULUSLARARASI POLİTİK İKTİSAT, GLOBAL REGÜLASYON

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