What did the Turkish Competition Authority Ignore in its First Hub-and-Spoke Cartel Decision?
Öz
Anahtar Kelimeler
Hub-and-spoke cartel, Turkish Competition Authority, Organized retail market
Kaynakça
- Amir, R. & Stepanova, A. (2006). Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly. Games and Economic Behavior, 55(1), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004
- Food Retailers Association. (2021a). Members Catalogue 2021. https://www.gidaperakendecileri.org/?page_id=799
- Food Retailers Association. (2021b). Retail Shopping Report. https://www.gidaperakendecileri.org/?p=4202
- Deloitte. (2022). Global Powers of Retailing 2022. https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/assets-shared/legacy/docs/analysis/2022/gx-global-powers-of-retailing-2022.pdf
- Garrod, L., Harrington, J. E. & Olczak, M. (2021). Hub-and-Spoke Cartels: Why They Form, How They Operate, and How to Prosecute Them. The MIT Press.
- Harrington, J. E. (2017). The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy. MIT Press.
- Klein, B. (2020). Inferring Agreement in Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies. Antitrust Law Journal, 83(1), 127-164.
- OECD. (2019). Roundtable on Hub-and-Spoke Arrangements – Background Note. In OECD. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)14/en/pdf
- Orbach, B. (2016). Hub-and-spoke conspiracies. The Antitrust Source, 15(4), 1-15. http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr16_orbach_4_11f.authcheckdam.pdf
- Turkish Competition Authority. (2021a). Board Decision, numbered 121-53/747-360, dated 28.10.2021. https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Karar?kararId=82884ab7-9d26-405c-9019-e2b9ee10f2c7