Kuantum Anahtar Dağıtım Protokolleri ve Saldırı Yöntemleri

Öz

Kriptografi, modern dünyada güvenli iletişim için hayati öneme haizdir. Son yıllardaki teknolojik gelişmeler, günümüz kriptografisini tehdit edebilecek kuantum bilgisayarların yakın gelecekte ortaya çıkabileceğini gösterdi. Bu durumda geleneksel kriptografi metotları güvenli iletişimi sağlamada yeterli olamayacağından, Kuantum Sonrası Kriptografi (KSK) algoritmaları ve Kuantum Anahtar Dağıtım (KAD) sistemleri gibi çözümler öne çıkmaktadır. KAD sistemlerinin güvenliği, geleneksel kriptografik metotların aksine doğa yasalarına dayandığından, teoride tamamen güvenli olsa da teknolojik yetersizlikler nedeniyle pratikte henüz tamamen güvenli değil. Bu derlemede, KAD sistemlerinin güvenliğini tehdit eden saldırı yöntemlerine kapsamlı bir bakış sunulurken, kriptografinin tarihi, KSK algoritmaları, kuantum mekaniği, KAD protokolleri ve uygulama alanları da incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kuantum
• Anahtar Dağıtımı
• KAD
• Saldırı
• Hacking
• BB84
• B92
• E91
• SARG04
• Kriptografi
• Kriptoloji

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols and Attack Methods

Öz

Cryptography has always been a sensitive topic, but in the modern world, it has become crucial for secure communication. Recent technological advancements indicate that quantum computers, which could undermine today's cryptographic methods, may emerge in the near future. In this case, traditional cryptographic methods may not be sufficient to ensure secure communication, bringing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems to the forefront. The security of QKD systems is guaranteed by the laws of nature, rather than traditional cryptographic methods. However, while QKD is theoretically completely secure, current technological limitations mean these systems are not yet completely secure in practice. In this paper, I present a comprehensive literature review and comparative study on QKD hacking strategies while also discussing the history of cryptography, PQC algorithms, quantum mechanics, QKD protocols, and their application areas.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Quantum
• Key Distribution
• QKD
• Attack
• Hacking
• BB84
• B92
• E91
• SARG04
• Cryptography
• Cryptology

Kaynakça

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