Tepe Yönetici Ücretlerinin FirmaPerformansına Duyarlılığı: Türkiye’denBulgular

Yıl 2017, Sayı: 631, 65 - 73, 01.09.2017

Aylin Ataay

Öz

Bu çalışma, tepe yönetici ücretlerinin firma performansına duyarlılığını, 2009- 2013 yıllarını kapsayan bir panel veri modeli aracılığıyla belirlemeyi hedeflemiştir. Çalışmada ilgili yazına gelişen bir ülke bakış açısı getirilmekte ve kurumsal yönetim mekanizmalarının gelişmiş ülkelere göre farklılıklar gösterdiği Türkiye ortamında, tepe yönetici ücretlerinin performansa duyarlılığı konusunda bulgular sunulmaktadır. İncelememiz vekâlet kuramını destekler şekilde, tepe yönetici ücretleri ile şirketlerin aktif karlılığı arasında aynı yönlü bir ilişki belirlenmiştir. Halka açık ve finandışı şirketlerden oluşan örneklemimizde, tepe yönetici ücretlerinin firma performansına duyarlı olduğu, firm performansındaki artışların tepe yönetici ücretlerinde artışa neden olduğu belirlenmiştir. Bu bulgudan yola çıkarak, şirketlerin firma performansına dayalı özendiricileri içeren ücret sistemleri kullandıklarını söylemek mümkündür.

Anahtar Kelimeler

tepe yönetici ücretleri, firma performansı, ücret-performans duyarlılığı, Türkiye

Performance Sensitivity of Top Management Team Compensation: Evidence from Turkey

Öz

This study aims to investigate the sensitivity of top management team compensation to firm performance through a panel data model covering the period of 2009-2013. The study brings a perspective of emerging economy in the current literature and aims to contribute to the field by presenting findings on performance sensitivity of top executive pay from Turkey where corporate governance mechanisms differ drastically from that of the developed countries. In line with the agency theory expectations, we found a positive relationship between firms’ return on assets and executive compensation. In other words, in our sample which consists of publicly traded non-financial companies, we found that executive pay is sensitive to firm performance. Based on this finding, we conclude that listed public companies in Turkey adopt compensation systems that include incentives based on firm performance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

top management team compensation, executive compensation, firm performance, pay-performance sensitivity, Turkey

Kaynakça

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