Learning in Games: Two Experiments

Yıl 2015, Sayı: 605, 41 - 59, 01.07.2015

Fehime Ceren Ay , Barış Baykara Hasan Can Külahçıoğlu

Öz

Experimental methods are even more popular in the last 40 years and became one of the fundamental instruments of empirical economic researches. Experimental economics provides a way to test the mathematical models created to explain the behaviours of economic agents and to observe those behaviours under different circumstances. In this paper, we will conduct two experiments to illustrate. The first experiment is on the Braess paradox suggesting that adding an additional route to a road topology may increase the amount spent in traffic when the drivers selfishly choose their route and the second is a Cournot oligopoly environment; quantity competition suggesting that competing firms will produce less than competitive quantity and more than collusive amount. This paper, explores the ability of rational decision making experimentally, in the scope of Braess Paradox and Cournot Oligopoly Model with two groups of participators for both experiments from different educational backgrounds

Anahtar Kelimeler

rationality, selfish behaviour, social optimum, experimental economics, congestions, competition, cournot, braess paradox, learning effect

Oyunlarda Öğrenme: İki Deney

Öz

İktisat bilimine deneysel yaklaşımlar son 40 yılda popülerliğini artırmış ve ampirik analizde önemli araçlardan biri haline gelmiştir. Davranışları matematiksel temellerde modellenen ajanların daima rasyonel davrandığı düşünülürken bu modellerin test edilmesi ve bireylerin farklı durumlarda aldığı kararların incelenebilmesi sağlanmıştır. Bu makalede, iki farklı ortamda yapılan deney ile bu durumu örneklendireceğiz. Braess paradoksu, günlük hayatta her bir bireyin karşılaştığı yol seçimi sorununu konu edinirken, Cournot oligipol modeli ise miktar rekabeti durumunda verilen üretim kararı üzerinden karar alma davranışını incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, rasyonel karar alma kabiliyetini farklı alanlarda eğitim alan öğrenciler üzerinden Braess paradoksu ve Cournot modeli dahilinde deneysel olarak incelemektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

rasyonalite, bencil seçim, sosyal optimum, deneysel iktisat, ağ tıkanıklıkları, rekabet, cournot oligopol modeli, braess paradoksu, öğrenme etkisi

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