From Al-Qaeda to Post-DEASHEra: Transformation of Global Militant Salafi Movement and Its Future

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 2, 134 - 148, 01.12.2019

Göktuğ Sönmez

Öz

Due to the Soviet attempt to invade Afghanistan, the subsequent “Afghan Jihad” was supported by the West in the bipolar international system back then and the mujahideen were widely praised in the Western media. After the defeat of the Soviets along with the Soviet inability to keep up with the military and economic race that caused the end of the Cold War, a new approach was adopted. During this period, a significant portion of the fighters of both Afghan origin and the ones coming from other countries moved to more organized structures, Taliban gained power and a new threat emerged with al-Qaeda attacks in the early 90s. In this process, some of the “mujahideen” who were praised in the USSR intervention started to be regarded as a key threat to the security of the region and the world. This issue, which entered the world agenda more seriously after 9/11, has become one of the top priorities in the international security agenda together with the Iraqi al-Qaeda and the DEASH. In this study, after briefly mentioning the al-Qaeda structure and its transformation since the Soviet intervention, the emergence of DEASH, its exceptional financial power and the visibility in the cyber world will be discussed. The post-ISIS scenarios and the way forward to counter those will be evaluated

Anahtar Kelimeler

DEASH, Terrorism, Syria, Libya, Counter Terrorism

El-Kaide’den DEAŞ Sonrası Döneme: Küresel Militan Selefi Hareketin Dönüşümü ve Geleceği

Öz

Sovyetler’in Afganistan’ı işgal girişimi ve “Afgan Cihadı” dönemin iki kutuplu sisteminde destek görmüş, “mücahid”ler Batı medyasında haklarında çıkan övgü dolu haberlerle tanınmıştır. Sovyetler’in Afganistan’daki hezimeti ve o dönemde Soğuk Savaş’ın sonunu getiren önemli sebeplerden biri olan ekonomik yük nedeniyle Afganistan’dan çekilmesini takip eden süreçte ise farklı bir döneme girilmiştir. Bu dönemde Afganistan’daki gerek Afgan asıllı gerek diğer ülkelerden gelen savaşçıların önemli bölümü daha organize yapılanmalara gitmiş, Taliban güç kazanmış, 90’ların ilk yarısındaki el-Kaide saldırılarıyla yeni bir tehdide dikkat çekilmeye başlanmıştır. SSCB müdahalesi sürecinde övgüyle haklarından bahsedilen “mücahid”ler içerisindeki kimi yapılar artık terörist sıfatıyla ve bölge ve dünya güvenliğine tehdit oluşturan bir tehdit unsuru olarak nitelenmeye başlanmıştır. 11 Eylül’le birlikte çok daha ciddi biçimde dünya gündemine giren bu tehdit Irak’ın işgali sonrasında Irak el-Kaidesi ve sonra bu yapı bünyesinden güçlenerek çıkacak olan Irak Şam İslam Devleti DEAŞ ile birlikte en öncelikli başlıklardan biri haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada Sovyet müdahalesinden bugüne kısaca el-Kaide yapılanması ve dönüşümüne değinilmesini takiben DEAŞ’ın ortaya çıkışı, örgütün istisnai bir “başarı” gösterdiği finansal güç ve siber dünyadaki görünürlüğü ele alınacak, örgütün sahadaki yükseliş ve düşüşü irdelendikten sonra takip eden süreçte ne gibi senaryolar ortaya çıkabileceği ve bunlara ne şekilde çözüm üretebileceğine dair değerlendirmeler yapılacaktır

Anahtar Kelimeler

DEAŞ, Terörizm, Suriye, Libya, Terörle Mücadele

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