NOBEL İKTİSAT ÖDÜLÜ SAHİPLERİ BENGT HOLMSTRÖM VE OLIVER HART’IN SÖZLEŞME TEORİSİNE KATKILARI

Öz

Bengt Holmström ve Oliver Hart sözleşme teorisine ilişkin yaptıkları katkılarla 2016 yılında Sveriges Riksbank Ödülü ya da bilinen adıyla Alfred Nobel anısına verilen Nobel İktisat Ödülünü kazanmışlardır. Bu çalışmada her iki araştırmacının kısa hayat hikayeleri ve sonrasında sözleşme teorisine ilişkin öz bir bilgi verilmektedir. Ardından Holmström ve Hart tarafından bu alana yapılan katkılar sunulmaktadır. Hukuk ve iktisat ile hukukun iktisadi analizi çerçevesinde konular incelenerek sözleşme teorine ilişkin tespitler ortaya koyulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Sözleşme Teorisi İktisadı
• Nobel İktisat Ödülü
• Tamamlanmamış ya da Eksik Sözleşmeler
• Hukuk ve İktisat
• Hukukun İktisadi Analizi.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF NOBEL ECONOMICS PRIZE WINNER BENGT HOLMSTRÖM AND OLIVER HART TO CONTRACT THEORY

Öz

Bengt Holmström ve Oliver Hart were awarded th 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. In this study, short life stories of both researchers are given then a brief information about the economics of contract theory is given. Then, the contributions made by Holmström and Hart to this field are presented. The issues are analyzed within the framework of law and economics and the economic analysis of law, and determinations regarding contract theory are put forward.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Contract Theory
• Nobel Economy Prize
• Incomplete Contracts
• Law and Economics
• Economic Anaylsis of Law.

Kaynakça

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