KAMU TERCİHİ PERSPEKTİFİNDEN OYUN TEORİSİ

Yıl 2013, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2, 93 - 117, 01.12.2013

Coşkun Can Aktan Abdullah Burhan Bahçe

Öz

Oyun teorisi, bireyler, organizasyonlar ve devletler arasındaki müzakere, çatışma ve işbirliği gibi konuları matematik modellerle inceleyen bir disiplindir. Bir başka ifadeyle, oyun teorisi mevcut veriler ve kısıtlar içerisinde karar verme ve tercihte bulunma durumunda olan aktörlerin kazançlarını maksimize ve kayıplarını (maliyetlerini) minimize etme stratejilerini çoğunlukla matrisler yardımıyla analizlere tabi tutan bir disiplindir. Oyun teorisinde bireyler arasındaki iletişim ve etkileşim ve bunun etkileri inceleme konusu yapılmaktadır. Kamu tercihi ise, kamu kesiminde karar alma ve tercihleri analiz eden bir ekonomi disiplininin adıdır. Bu araştırmada kamu tercihi literatüründe ele alınan başlıca oyunlar incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Oyun teorisi

Kaynakça

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