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AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 17 Sayı: 3, 112 - 135

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This work contains notes on an interview with Hartmut Kliemt on James M. Buchanan Opera Omnia.

Kaynakça

  • References (1)
  • One of the reports to the Nobel Committee in 1985 can be found under https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31446/1/366229192.pdf
  • Material from the Buchanan house can be found https://aspace.gmu.edu/repositories/2/resources/367 Accessed August 24, 2025. James M. Buchanan papers, C0246, Special Collections Research Center, George Mason University Libraries.
  • References (2)
  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (01 Aufl.). Profile Books.
  • Albert, H. (1958). Das Ende der Wohlfahrtsökonomik. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 9. Jahrgang.
  • Albert, H. (1985). Treatise on Critical Reason. Princeton University Press.
  • Albert, H. (2010). The economic tradition and the constitution of science. Public Choice, 144(3/4), 401–411.
  • Brennan, G. (2015). Buchanan’s anti-conservatism. Public Choice, 163(1/2), 7–7.
  • Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. (1984). Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives. American Behavioral Scientist, 28(2), 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/000276484028002003
  • Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The Reason of Rules. Cambridge University Press.
  • Brennan, G., & Kliemt, H. (2018, Februar 20). Buchanan on exchange.
  • Brennan, H. G., & Kliemt, H. (2019). The constitution of markets. In James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, ed. Wagner, R. (1st ed. 2018, S. 807–838). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Brennan, H. G., Kliemt, H., & Tollison, R. D. (1999). The Collected Works of James Buchanan (Bde. 1–20). Liberty Fund.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1965a). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32, 1–14.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1965b). Ethics, Expected Values, and Large Numbers. Ethics, LXXVI, 1-13.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1975). An Ambiguity in Sen’s Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Liberal. Analyse & Kritik, 18(1), 118–125.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1993). Property As a Guarantor of Liberty (Bd. 1). Edvard Elgar. https://www.amazon.de/-/en/James-M-Buchanan/dp/1852787333
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Congleton, R. (1998). Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Devletoglou, N. E. (1970). Academia in Anarchy. Basic Books.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (1994). The Return to Increasing Returns. University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (2000). A Smithean Perspective on Increasing Returns. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 22(1), 43. Business Source Premier. https://doi.org/10.1080/104277100112545
  • Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods (second). Cambridge University Press.
  • Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI(1), 265–282.
  • Deaton, A. (2013). The great escape: Health, wealth, and the origins of inequality. Princeton Univ. Press.
  • Dekker, E. (2025). Kenneth Boulding and James Buchanan on the public function of economics. The Review of Austrian Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-025-00677-3
  • Gächter, S., Molleman, L., & Nosenzo, D. (2025). Why people follow rules. Nature Human Behaviour. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02196-4
  • Gaertner, W., Pattanaik, P. K., & Suzumura, K. (1992). Individual Rights Revisited. Economica, 59, 161–177.
  • Gordon, S. (1999). Controlling the State. Harvard University Press.
  • Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. Penguin.
  • Hall, J. C. (2020). Academia in Anarchy: 50 years on. Public Choice, 183, 12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00793-7
  • Hamilton, A., Jay, J., & Madison, J. (2001). The Federalist. Liberty Fund. http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=788
  • Henrich, J. (2016). The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter. Princeton University Press.
  • Henrich, J. (2020). The Weirdest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (01 Edition). Allen Lane.
  • Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), 61–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
  • Hume, D. (1739, 1896). A Treatise of Human Nature (1896 ed.)—Online Library of Liberty. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a-treatise-of-human-nature#Hume_0213_1107
  • Hume, D. (1985). Essays. Moral, Political and Literary. Liberty Fund.
  • Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin.
  • Keynes, J. M. (1997). The general theory of employment, interest, and money. Prometheus Books.
  • Kliemt, H. (1986). The Veil of Insignificance. European Journal of Political Economy, 2/3, 333–344.
  • Kliemt, H. (2006). The world is a table. Economic philosophy stated flatly in terms of rows, columns and cells. In G. Eusepi & A. Hamlin (Hrsg.), Beyond Conventional Economics. The Limits of Rational Behaviour in Political Decision Making (S. 125–143). Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Kliemt, H. (2024). The nature and sicgnificance of the Rule of Law. Kyklos, 77(4), 1084–1102. https://doi-org.ezproxy.uni-giessen.de/10.1111/kykl.12407
  • Lehto, O., & Meadowcroft, J. (2021). Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state. Constitutional Political Economy, 32(2), 145–164. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09321-7
  • MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy In Chains: The Deep History Of The Radical Right’s Stealth Plan For America. Scribe UK.
  • Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 24, 171–193.
  • Pettit, P. (2014). Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. Norton Global Ethics.
  • Popper, K. R. (2020). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1951). Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics. Philosophical Review, 60, 177–190.
  • Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan.
  • Roth, A. (2016). Who Gets What - And Why: Understand the Choices You Have, Improve the Choices You Make. HARPER COLLINS.
  • Schmidtz, D. (2023). Living Together: Inventing Moral Science. Oxford University Press Inc.
  • Sugden, R. (1985). Liberty, preference, and choice. Economics and Philosophy, 1(2), 213–229.
  • Sugden, R. (2018). The Community of Advantage. Oxford University Press.
  • Vanberg, V. (1994). Rules and Choice in Economics.
  • Vickrey, W. (1948). Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk. Econometrica, 13, 319–333.
  • Wootton, D. (2016). The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution (1. Edition). Penguin.

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 17 Sayı: 3, 112 - 135

Öz

Kaynakça

  • References (1)
  • One of the reports to the Nobel Committee in 1985 can be found under https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/31446/1/366229192.pdf
  • Material from the Buchanan house can be found https://aspace.gmu.edu/repositories/2/resources/367 Accessed August 24, 2025. James M. Buchanan papers, C0246, Special Collections Research Center, George Mason University Libraries.
  • References (2)
  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (01 Aufl.). Profile Books.
  • Albert, H. (1958). Das Ende der Wohlfahrtsökonomik. Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 9. Jahrgang.
  • Albert, H. (1985). Treatise on Critical Reason. Princeton University Press.
  • Albert, H. (2010). The economic tradition and the constitution of science. Public Choice, 144(3/4), 401–411.
  • Brennan, G. (2015). Buchanan’s anti-conservatism. Public Choice, 163(1/2), 7–7.
  • Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. (1984). Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives. American Behavioral Scientist, 28(2), 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/000276484028002003
  • Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The Reason of Rules. Cambridge University Press.
  • Brennan, G., & Kliemt, H. (2018, Februar 20). Buchanan on exchange.
  • Brennan, H. G., & Kliemt, H. (2019). The constitution of markets. In James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, ed. Wagner, R. (1st ed. 2018, S. 807–838). Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Brennan, H. G., Kliemt, H., & Tollison, R. D. (1999). The Collected Works of James Buchanan (Bde. 1–20). Liberty Fund.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1965a). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32, 1–14.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1965b). Ethics, Expected Values, and Large Numbers. Ethics, LXXVI, 1-13.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1975). An Ambiguity in Sen’s Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Liberal. Analyse & Kritik, 18(1), 118–125.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1993). Property As a Guarantor of Liberty (Bd. 1). Edvard Elgar. https://www.amazon.de/-/en/James-M-Buchanan/dp/1852787333
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Congleton, R. (1998). Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Devletoglou, N. E. (1970). Academia in Anarchy. Basic Books.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (1994). The Return to Increasing Returns. University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M., & Yoon, Y. J. (2000). A Smithean Perspective on Increasing Returns. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 22(1), 43. Business Source Premier. https://doi.org/10.1080/104277100112545
  • Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods (second). Cambridge University Press.
  • Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI(1), 265–282.
  • Deaton, A. (2013). The great escape: Health, wealth, and the origins of inequality. Princeton Univ. Press.
  • Dekker, E. (2025). Kenneth Boulding and James Buchanan on the public function of economics. The Review of Austrian Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-025-00677-3
  • Gächter, S., Molleman, L., & Nosenzo, D. (2025). Why people follow rules. Nature Human Behaviour. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02196-4
  • Gaertner, W., Pattanaik, P. K., & Suzumura, K. (1992). Individual Rights Revisited. Economica, 59, 161–177.
  • Gordon, S. (1999). Controlling the State. Harvard University Press.
  • Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. Penguin.
  • Hall, J. C. (2020). Academia in Anarchy: 50 years on. Public Choice, 183, 12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00793-7
  • Hamilton, A., Jay, J., & Madison, J. (2001). The Federalist. Liberty Fund. http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=788
  • Henrich, J. (2016). The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter. Princeton University Press.
  • Henrich, J. (2020). The Weirdest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (01 Edition). Allen Lane.
  • Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), 61–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
  • Hume, D. (1739, 1896). A Treatise of Human Nature (1896 ed.)—Online Library of Liberty. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a-treatise-of-human-nature#Hume_0213_1107
  • Hume, D. (1985). Essays. Moral, Political and Literary. Liberty Fund.
  • Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin.
  • Keynes, J. M. (1997). The general theory of employment, interest, and money. Prometheus Books.
  • Kliemt, H. (1986). The Veil of Insignificance. European Journal of Political Economy, 2/3, 333–344.
  • Kliemt, H. (2006). The world is a table. Economic philosophy stated flatly in terms of rows, columns and cells. In G. Eusepi & A. Hamlin (Hrsg.), Beyond Conventional Economics. The Limits of Rational Behaviour in Political Decision Making (S. 125–143). Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Kliemt, H. (2024). The nature and sicgnificance of the Rule of Law. Kyklos, 77(4), 1084–1102. https://doi-org.ezproxy.uni-giessen.de/10.1111/kykl.12407
  • Lehto, O., & Meadowcroft, J. (2021). Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state. Constitutional Political Economy, 32(2), 145–164. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09321-7
  • MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy In Chains: The Deep History Of The Radical Right’s Stealth Plan For America. Scribe UK.
  • Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 24, 171–193.
  • Pettit, P. (2014). Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. Norton Global Ethics.
  • Popper, K. R. (2020). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1951). Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics. Philosophical Review, 60, 177–190.
  • Robbins, L. (1932). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan.
  • Roth, A. (2016). Who Gets What - And Why: Understand the Choices You Have, Improve the Choices You Make. HARPER COLLINS.
  • Schmidtz, D. (2023). Living Together: Inventing Moral Science. Oxford University Press Inc.
  • Sugden, R. (1985). Liberty, preference, and choice. Economics and Philosophy, 1(2), 213–229.
  • Sugden, R. (2018). The Community of Advantage. Oxford University Press.
  • Vanberg, V. (1994). Rules and Choice in Economics.
  • Vickrey, W. (1948). Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk. Econometrica, 13, 319–333.
  • Wootton, D. (2016). The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution (1. Edition). Penguin.
Toplam 57 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Hukuk ve İktisat
Bölüm JAMES M. BUCHANAN (1919-2013) ÖZEL SAYISI - THE SPECIAL ISSUE DEDICATED TO NOBEL LAUREATE JAMES M. BUCHANAN
Yazarlar

Serdar Yay

Erken Görünüm Tarihi 28 Ağustos 2025
Yayımlanma Tarihi 19 Ekim 2025
Gönderilme Tarihi 27 Ağustos 2025
Kabul Tarihi 28 Ağustos 2025
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2025 Cilt: 17 Sayı: 3

Kaynak Göster

APA Yay, S. (2025). AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi, 17(3), 112-135.
AMA Yay S. AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi. Ağustos 2025;17(3):112-135.
Chicago Yay, Serdar. “AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA”. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi 17, sy. 3 (Ağustos 2025): 112-35.
EndNote Yay S (01 Ağustos 2025) AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi 17 3 112–135.
IEEE S. Yay, “AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA”, Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi, c. 17, sy. 3, ss. 112–135, 2025.
ISNAD Yay, Serdar. “AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA”. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi 17/3 (Ağustos2025), 112-135.
JAMA Yay S. AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi. 2025;17:112–135.
MLA Yay, Serdar. “AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA”. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi, c. 17, sy. 3, 2025, ss. 112-35.
Vancouver Yay S. AN INTERVIEW WITH HARTMUT KLIEMT ON JAMES M. BUCHANAN OPERA OMNIA. Hukuk ve İktisat Araştırmaları Dergisi. 2025;17(3):112-35.