Narrow MFN Clauses from Competition Law and Economics Prespective

Abstract

Digital platforms have become significant for the operation of the global economy, as they bring numerous benefits for consumers and undertakings, but the widespread use of most favored nation (MFN) clauses in e-commerce poses important challenges for policymakers. Ordinarily, such clauses have been implemented in traditional industries; however, the economic dynamics of e-commerce have made these clauses a cornerstone for digital platforms, as they enable platforms to adhere to competitive price guarantees. Unlike traditional MFN clauses, platform MFN clauses, which include restrictions on consumer purchase price, have a significant restrictive impact on the market and are often the subject of complaints from commercial users, such as retailers, restaurants, and hotels. Thus, platform MFN clauses have been the subject of scrutiny by competition authorities in recent years, and under some conditions, these clauses have been found problematic. MFN clauses are examined under narrow and wide headings, and primarily wide MFN clauses (depending on the existence of market power) are prohibited. Nevertheless, narrow MFN clauses are considered legal; however, under certain conditions, narrow MFN clauses may also harm the competitive environment in the market. This is particularly the case for scenarios of high market power of the platform for which the narrow MFN clause is accepted, and the direct channel serves as an important alternative for consumers. This study aims to examine the conditions under which such clauses can pose competition law risks and to distinguish scenarios in which the competition law interference of narrow MFN clauses is likely.

Keywords

• Platforms
• MFN Clauses
• Competition Law
• Narrow MFN
• Digital Markets

Rekabet Hukuku ve İktisadı Bağlamında Dar Platform EKM Koşulları

Abstract

Platform iş modelinin çevrimiçi ticaret içerisindeki yerinin artmasının önemli sonuçlarından biri de en çok kayrılan müşteri koşullarının piyasada yaygın bir şekilde kullanılmasıdır. Bu koşullar, esasen geleneksel piyasalarda da kullanılmaktadır. Fakat, çevrimiçi ticaretin ekonomik dinamikleri, bu koşulları dijital platformlar için önemli hâle getirmiştir. Geleneksel en çok kayrılan müşteri koşullarından farklı olarak, doğrudan tüketicinin alış fiyatına ilişkin bir sınırlama içeren platform en çok kayrılan müşteri koşulları, piyasada önemli etki göstermekte ve perakendeci, restoran ve oteller gibi ticari kullanıcıların şikâyetlerine sık sık konu olmaktadır. Bunun sonucu olarak platform en çok kayrılan müşteri koşulları, son yıllarda rekabet otoriteleri tarafından inceleme konusu olmuş ve bazı şartlar altında bu koşullara rekabeti sınırlayıcı olduğu gerekçesiyle müdahale edilmiştir. Verilen kararlar incelendiği zaman, en çok kayrılan müşteri koşullarının, dar ve geniş olmak üzere iki başlık altında incelendiği ve daha ziyade geniş en çok kayrılan müşteri koşullarının (piyasa gücünün de varlığına bağlı olarak) yasaklandığı görülmektedir. Öte yandan, dar en çok kayrılan müşteri olarak adlandırılan sözleşme hükümleri ise çoğunlukla hukuka uygun görülmektedir. Ne var ki muhtelif bazı koşullar altında, dar en çok kayrılan müşteri koşulu da piyasadaki rekabet ortamına zarar verebilir. Bu durum özellikle, lehine dar en çok kayrılan müşteri koşulu kabul edilen platformun piyasa gücünün bulunması, doğrudan kanalın tüketiciler için önemli bir alternatif olduğu kurgularda söz konusu olur.

Keywords

• Platform
• EKM koşulu
• Rekabet Hukuku
• Dar EKM
• Dijital Piyasalar

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