A CASE STUDY FOR TURKEY: A SECURE PAPER-BASED ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM

Yıl 2011, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 1, 133 - 145, 01.06.2011

Oktay Adalier Fatih Birinci Süleyman Kardaş Mehmet Sabır Kiraz

Öz

There are several electronic voting systems proposed in the literature either paper-based method,
using voter’s computer and internet or direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine. These
systems aim to satisfy the security properties like voter privacy, receipt-freeness, anonymity,
verifiability, reliability, and usability. Besides, they mainly focus on the ballot tallying in order to
solve the first conflict by achieving voter privacy and verifiability simultaneously. The most
popular systems are based on homomorphic cryptosystems and mix-nets. These cryptographic evoting
schemes require all voters to have an advanced knowledge of mathematics. This
requirement may not be realistic for many of the ordinary voters. Some suggestions require voters
to indicate their intent to some voting devices (e.g. DRE machines). Prêt à Voter scheme, which is
invented by Peter Ryan, is also another type of electronic voting scheme which is similar to paperbased
systems. Although its backend uses advanced cryptographic mechanisms it is simple to
understand for any ordinary voters. In the Prêt à Voter scheme all ballot forms are generated by
some election authorities in advance under the supervision of some audits. So, the authorities have
the ability to read the voter’s choice directly from their receipts.
In this paper, we first describe the Prêt à Voter scheme and its cryptographic primitives. Next, we
investigate the efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of referendums in Turkey by providing a casestudy
of the Prêt à Voter scheme. We conclude the paper by proposing the possible improvements
and suggestions for Turkish elections.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Electronic voting, cryptographic protocols, Turkish elections

Kaynakça

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