RECONCEIVING THE REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS CRITERION

Abstract

The Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is widely considered one of six individually necessary requirements that must be satisfied for it to be ethically permissible to resort to war. For evaluations of this criterion success is understood to mean successful achievement of one’s Just Cause. Modern Just War Theory narrowly defines Just Cause as self-defence or defence of others. Many contemporary just war theorists interpret this to mean mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat. Such an understanding has generated a problem that has puzzled many just war theorists. Whilst there are clear moral reasons for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied, the demands of the contemporary understanding of this principle conflict with widespread, robust intuitions. One case that elicits such intuitions is Belgium’s decision to resist German aggression in 1914. In this case the relevant Belgium decision-makers knew that violent resistance could not mitigate or avert the imminent threat posed by Germany. Despite this they chose to defend themselves regardless. What transpired as a result is commonly referred to as the Rape of Belgium, with an estimated 30,000 casualties over the course of World War I. Resistance only managed to delay German forces for two days, and Germany maintained control of Belgium until the end of the war. Despite the fact that Belgium’s decision violated the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, most commentators believe that it was ethically permissible for Belgium to resort to force.This paper will attempt to vindicate these intuitions and solve the puzzle generated by the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. It will argue that despite appearances, the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion could have been satisfied when Belgium resisted German aggression in 1914. It will contend that resisting aggression in such circumstances can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved by deterring the aggressor state, or other would-be aggressors, from invading one’s own state, or other states, in the future. Crucially, it will be argued that this can be achieved even if the threat that is currently underway is not mitigated or averted. This will be linked to the importance of expressing an affirmation of the values of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. This paper will conclude by arguing that these consequences of resistance are both more likely to be brought about, and are of much more significance, given the anarchic international state system that exists

Keywords

• Reasonable Probability Of Success,Just War Theory,Political Philosophy,Applied Ethics.

Kaynakça

1. Bull, H., 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
2. Childress, J.F., 1978. “Just-war theories: the bases, interrelations, priorities, and functions of their criteria.” Theological Studies 39(3).
3. Coady, C.A.J., 2008. Morality and Political Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. Coates, A.J., 2016. The Ethics of War 2nd edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
5. Fabre, C., 2014. “Cosmopolitanism and Wars of Self-Defence.” In C. Fabre and S. Lazar eds. 2014. On the Morality of Defensive War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Fearon, J.D., 1995. “Rationalist Explanations For War.” International Organization 49(3).
7. Fletcher, P.F. and J.D. Ohlin, 2008. Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why. New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Fishback, I., 2016. “Necessity and Institutions in Self-Defense and War.” In C. Coons and M. Weber eds. 2016. The Ethics of Self-Defense. New York: Oxford University Press.

9. Fotion, N., 2002. “Proportionality.” In B. Coppieters and N. Fotion eds. 2002. Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases. New York: Lexington Books.
10. Gerlache, A.D., 1915. Belgium in War Time. Translated by Bernard Miall. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
11. Hurrell, A. 1977. “Foreword.” In H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
12. Jervis, R., 1989. “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” World Politics 41(2).
13. Lazar, S., 2010. “The Moral Importance of Winning.” CSSJ Working Papers Series, SJ015. Oxford: University of Oxford.
14. Lee, S.P., 2012. Ethics and War: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Maxweiler, E., 1915. Belgium Neutral and Loyal: The War of 1914. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.
16. Maxweiler, E., 1916. Belgium and The Great Powers: Her Neutrality Explained and Vindicated. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.
17. McMahan, J., 2014. “What Rights May Be Defended By Means of War?” In C. Fabre and S. Lazar eds. 2014. On the Morality of Defensive War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18. Schelling, T.C., 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
19. Sjoberg, L., 2009. “Gender, Just Cause and Non-State Actors.” In E. Heinze and B. Steele eds. 2009. Ethics, Authority and War: Non-state Actors and the Just War Tradition. Springer.
20. Statman, D., 2008. “On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense.” Ethics 118(4).
21. Steele, B.J. 2008. Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR state. London: Routledge.
22. Stranksy, S.G., 2011. “Re-Examining the Falkland Islands War: The Necessity for Multi-Level Deterrence in Preventing Wars of Aggression.” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 40.
23. Walzer, M., 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 4th edition. New York: Basic Books.
24. Zagare, F.C., 1996. “Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment.” International Interactions 21(4).