BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster
Yıl 2018, Cilt: 4 Sayı: 9, 238 - 247, 01.03.2018

Öz

Kaynakça

  • Agande, Ben. (2013). “Boko Haram leader Shekau shot, escapes to Mali”. The Vanguard. www.vanguardngr.com› Headlines (accessed 19 January 2013).
  • Ajazeera News. (2015). The Boko Haram kill (100) one hundred people at Bega town to set Islamic state in North Eastern Nigeria”. http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20.U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf (accessed 10 January 2015).
  • Andrew, Walker. (2012). “What is Boko Haram?”. U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), 3.
  • Bartolotta, C. (2011). “Terrorism in Nigeria: The rise of Boko Haram”. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 9.
  • “Boko Haram chief killed in Adamawa, 156 arrested”. (2012). This Day Live. www.book.xlibx.info/.../3475778-7-international-crisis-gro... (accessed 25 September 2012).
  • “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency”. (2014). International Crisis Group Africa Report, N°216: 25. ttps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi. (accessed 21 May 2014).
  • Eme, O.I, et al. 2012. “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”. AJBMR, 1 (9): 77-99.
  • Hall, John. (2013). “Nigeria massacre: Boko Haram Islamists kill 42 at boarding school in Yobe state”. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-massacre-bokoharam-islamists-kill-42-at-boarding-school-in-yobe-state-8695355.html (accessed 8 July 2013).
  • Ikechukwu, Dialoke1 and Ugochukwu, .U. Ikeije. (2015). Why we attacked Baga–Boko Haram. http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20.U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf (accessed 29 January 2015).
  • In 2011, more than 30 bank robberies were attributed to the Boko Haram, “The Boko Haram armed robbers attack 100 bank branches”. This Day. www.thepeoplehistory.com/december10th.html (accessed 10 December 2011).
  • In May 2013, a senior Nigerian military official said “the Boko Haram fighters were “very, very wellarmed with weapons from Libya”. “Nigerian military in heavy fighting with the Boko Haram militants”. The Guardian, London. ttps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi. (accessed 21 May 2013). International Crisis Group Africa Report N°208, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? (2013): 36- 45.
  • Mohammed, M. (2012). Violence and Threat to Yobe’s Economic Growth, The Moment. https://www.omicsonline.com/.../the-socioeconomic-implica (accessed 7 March 2012).
  • “New threat in Nigeria as militants split off”. (23 April 2013). The New York Times. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/.../boko-haram-and-the-kidnappi... (accessed 29 May 2014).
  • “Niger: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism”. (2008). U.S. Embassy Niamey Cable. WikiLeaks. http://www.book.xlibx.info/bo-political/3475778-8-international-crisis-group-headquarters-avenuelouise-149-1050-br.php. (accessed 16 December 2008).
  • Nigeria: Suicide bombers now package IEDs in school bags. (2013). Weekly Trust. allafrica.com/stories/201310120190.html-(accessed 12 October 2013).
  • Okah, Henry. (2009). “The Boko Haram declares war”. Africa Confidential. http://www.africaconfidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3054/Henry_Okah (accessed 24 June 2009).
  • Okereocha, C. (2012). Heartache for the Economy, TELL. (14 May 2012): 46–47.
  • Okpanga A., Ugwu, S.C. and Eme, O.I. (2012). “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”. Arabain Journal of Business and Management Review, 1 (9), 10.
  • Olaide, I A. (2013). “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its implication and the way forwards towards avoidance of future insurgency”. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3 (11), 16.
  • Onuoha, Freedom. (2014). The Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. In de montclos, perouse (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the state in Nigeria. Leiden: Africa Studies Centre, 158.
  • Onuoha, Freedom. (2013). “The Cost of Boko Haram Attacks on Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure in Nigeria”. e-International Relations. www.e-ir.info (accessed 3 November 2013).
  • “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060”. (2013). S/2013/413: 66-67.
  • Special Report: Boko Haram. Control Risks. (February 2013).
  • Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). (2011). Citing the latter case and the Madalla Church 2011 Christmas attack, the U.S. named Shekau and two lieutenants–Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi–as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”. (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.
  • Terje, ØsTeBØ. (2012). “Islamic militancy in Africa”. Africa Security Brief, 23 (11), 2.
  • “The Boko Haram launches major urban attack against Nigerian military”. Agence France-Presse. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=239720...(accessed 2 December 2013).
  • The International Crisis Group analyst interview, Yusuf’s brother-in-law Babakura Fugu. (2011). He was part of a meeting between former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Yusuf’s family and sect members when they presented these demands as conditions for ceasefire.
  • The International Crisis Group Report. (2013). “Understanding Islamism” The “pious ancestors”– al-Salaf al-Salih–are invoked mainly as exemplars of the good Muslim, but also as validators of conservative readings of scripture”.
  • The International Crisis Group Roundtable. (2012). “The Boko Haram’s renewed insurgency from summer 2011, has been traced to the return of over 60 militants trained in Libya”. National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria. www.ndc.gov.ng/index.php/.../80-ndc-legacy-information. (accessed 8 February 2012).
  • The Middle East/North Africa Report N°115. (2011). “Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After Qadhafi”. old.crisisgroup.org/.../middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/l. (accessed 14 December 2011): 32-33.
  • They also looted and burned shops and homes, “5 aircraft destroyed in Maiduguri attack”. Daily Trust. https://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi..(accessed 3 December 2013).
  • “Under attack? Niger faced with religious extremism and terrorism”. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, N°7. Institute for Security Studies. (2013): 8.

THE NIGERIAN BOKO HARAM: FROM THE INCEPTION OF TERRORISM TO THE STAGNATION OF AN ECONOMY

Yıl 2018, Cilt: 4 Sayı: 9, 238 - 247, 01.03.2018

Öz

The continued bombings, killings, kidnappings and the destruction of property by the Boko Haram is great concern to the Nigerian government and the international community. Its activities has severe economic impacts on those states in the northeast of Nigeria. For example, the financial services sector is the most affected; Banks have begun closing down their business outlets due to a decrease in economic activities in the area. Also, employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posted to less volatile branches. The mass emigration of Nigerian citizens, who are non-indigenes to the northern region and of the major conflict affected cities in the northeast of Nigeria, is a formidable threat posed by the Boko Haram to the Nigerian economy. This paper concludes that the poor economic conditions in Nigeria, in general and northeast, in particular is generated by the Boko Haram.

Kaynakça

  • Agande, Ben. (2013). “Boko Haram leader Shekau shot, escapes to Mali”. The Vanguard. www.vanguardngr.com› Headlines (accessed 19 January 2013).
  • Ajazeera News. (2015). The Boko Haram kill (100) one hundred people at Bega town to set Islamic state in North Eastern Nigeria”. http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20.U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf (accessed 10 January 2015).
  • Andrew, Walker. (2012). “What is Boko Haram?”. U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), 3.
  • Bartolotta, C. (2011). “Terrorism in Nigeria: The rise of Boko Haram”. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 9.
  • “Boko Haram chief killed in Adamawa, 156 arrested”. (2012). This Day Live. www.book.xlibx.info/.../3475778-7-international-crisis-gro... (accessed 25 September 2012).
  • “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency”. (2014). International Crisis Group Africa Report, N°216: 25. ttps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi. (accessed 21 May 2014).
  • Eme, O.I, et al. 2012. “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”. AJBMR, 1 (9): 77-99.
  • Hall, John. (2013). “Nigeria massacre: Boko Haram Islamists kill 42 at boarding school in Yobe state”. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-massacre-bokoharam-islamists-kill-42-at-boarding-school-in-yobe-state-8695355.html (accessed 8 July 2013).
  • Ikechukwu, Dialoke1 and Ugochukwu, .U. Ikeije. (2015). Why we attacked Baga–Boko Haram. http://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/5.Ugochukwu%20.U.%20Ikeije-1.pdf (accessed 29 January 2015).
  • In 2011, more than 30 bank robberies were attributed to the Boko Haram, “The Boko Haram armed robbers attack 100 bank branches”. This Day. www.thepeoplehistory.com/december10th.html (accessed 10 December 2011).
  • In May 2013, a senior Nigerian military official said “the Boko Haram fighters were “very, very wellarmed with weapons from Libya”. “Nigerian military in heavy fighting with the Boko Haram militants”. The Guardian, London. ttps://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi. (accessed 21 May 2013). International Crisis Group Africa Report N°208, Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? (2013): 36- 45.
  • Mohammed, M. (2012). Violence and Threat to Yobe’s Economic Growth, The Moment. https://www.omicsonline.com/.../the-socioeconomic-implica (accessed 7 March 2012).
  • “New threat in Nigeria as militants split off”. (23 April 2013). The New York Times. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/.../boko-haram-and-the-kidnappi... (accessed 29 May 2014).
  • “Niger: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism”. (2008). U.S. Embassy Niamey Cable. WikiLeaks. http://www.book.xlibx.info/bo-political/3475778-8-international-crisis-group-headquarters-avenuelouise-149-1050-br.php. (accessed 16 December 2008).
  • Nigeria: Suicide bombers now package IEDs in school bags. (2013). Weekly Trust. allafrica.com/stories/201310120190.html-(accessed 12 October 2013).
  • Okah, Henry. (2009). “The Boko Haram declares war”. Africa Confidential. http://www.africaconfidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3054/Henry_Okah (accessed 24 June 2009).
  • Okereocha, C. (2012). Heartache for the Economy, TELL. (14 May 2012): 46–47.
  • Okpanga A., Ugwu, S.C. and Eme, O.I. (2012). “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria”. Arabain Journal of Business and Management Review, 1 (9), 10.
  • Olaide, I A. (2013). “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its implication and the way forwards towards avoidance of future insurgency”. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3 (11), 16.
  • Onuoha, Freedom. (2014). The Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. In de montclos, perouse (ed.), Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the state in Nigeria. Leiden: Africa Studies Centre, 158.
  • Onuoha, Freedom. (2013). “The Cost of Boko Haram Attacks on Critical Telecommunication Infrastructure in Nigeria”. e-International Relations. www.e-ir.info (accessed 3 November 2013).
  • “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060”. (2013). S/2013/413: 66-67.
  • Special Report: Boko Haram. Control Risks. (February 2013).
  • Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). (2011). Citing the latter case and the Madalla Church 2011 Christmas attack, the U.S. named Shekau and two lieutenants–Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi–as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists”. (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.
  • Terje, ØsTeBØ. (2012). “Islamic militancy in Africa”. Africa Security Brief, 23 (11), 2.
  • “The Boko Haram launches major urban attack against Nigerian military”. Agence France-Presse. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=239720...(accessed 2 December 2013).
  • The International Crisis Group analyst interview, Yusuf’s brother-in-law Babakura Fugu. (2011). He was part of a meeting between former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Yusuf’s family and sect members when they presented these demands as conditions for ceasefire.
  • The International Crisis Group Report. (2013). “Understanding Islamism” The “pious ancestors”– al-Salaf al-Salih–are invoked mainly as exemplars of the good Muslim, but also as validators of conservative readings of scripture”.
  • The International Crisis Group Roundtable. (2012). “The Boko Haram’s renewed insurgency from summer 2011, has been traced to the return of over 60 militants trained in Libya”. National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria. www.ndc.gov.ng/index.php/.../80-ndc-legacy-information. (accessed 8 February 2012).
  • The Middle East/North Africa Report N°115. (2011). “Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After Qadhafi”. old.crisisgroup.org/.../middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/l. (accessed 14 December 2011): 32-33.
  • They also looted and burned shops and homes, “5 aircraft destroyed in Maiduguri attack”. Daily Trust. https://www.ecoi.net/.../1226_1396951718_216-curbing-vi..(accessed 3 December 2013).
  • “Under attack? Niger faced with religious extremism and terrorism”. The ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, N°7. Institute for Security Studies. (2013): 8.
Toplam 32 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Research Article
Yazarlar

Kieran E. Uchehara

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Mart 2018
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2018 Cilt: 4 Sayı: 9

Kaynak Göster

APA Uchehara, K. E. (2018). THE NIGERIAN BOKO HARAM: FROM THE INCEPTION OF TERRORISM TO THE STAGNATION OF AN ECONOMY. Journal of Institute of Economic Development and Social Researches, 4(9), 238-247.