EX-POST APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES TO LARGE ONLINE PLATFORMS AT A NATIONAL LEVEL

Yıl 2024, , 135 - 169, 21.03.2024

Muzaffer Eroğlu , Alptekin Koksal

https://doi.org/10.58733/imhfd.1451588

Öz

The enormous market power enables Online Platforms to leverage their data and economic power to spread into the digital sector. Abuse of dominant position through various means, mainly exclusionary conduct, such as leveraging or self-preferencing, can be seen in the conduct of Online Platforms. Most countries, including international authorities such as the EU Commission, concluded that there is a gap in the law in the context of digital competition and decided to fill this gap through extensive regulation. However, digital life has just blossomed and is proliferating with technological development. Regulating a fast-changing and developing area would harm its character and innovative nature. Therefore, instead of a rushed ambition to regulate the area, which could be disruptive and harmful to the competition, all alternative methods should be considered before taking ambitious steps. In that case, a well-defined ex-post method could become a better alternative to address the competition problems in the digital sector. Therefore, this paper argues that recent competition interventions in the digital sector seem to be quite relevant and effective against competition problems present in the sector. Instead of an ex-ante regulation, which may hinder innovation and development in the long term, an ex-post could be the relevant solution to the current situation.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Competition, Structural Remedies, Ex-post Regulation, Digital Sector, Online Platforms, Digital Markets Act.

BÜYÜK ÇEVRİMİÇİ PLATFORMLARA YAPISAL ÇÖZÜMLERİN ULUSAL DÜZEYDE EX-POST UYGULAMASI

Öz

Büyük Platformların verilerinden ve ekonomik güçlerinden yararlanarak elde ettiği pazar gücü, teşebbüslerin bütün dijital sektöre yayılmasını sağlamaktadır. Büyük Platformların pazarda hâkim durumları kaynaklı davranışlarında, hâkim durumun çeşitli yollarla, özellikle kaldıraç etkisi yoluyla bir pazardaki gücün bir başka pazara aktarılması veya kendini tercih etme gibi dışlayıcı davranışlar yoluyla kötüye kullanılması mümkündür. Avrupa Birliği gibi uluslararası aktörler de dahil olmak üzere çoğu ülke, dijital rekabet bağlamında rekabet mevzuatının uygulanmasında sorunlar olduğu sonucuna varmış ve bu sorunun üstesinden kapsamlı ex-ante düzenlemelerle gelmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Bir başka deyişle dijital piyasaları regüle etmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Ancak dijital sosyal ve ticari hayat yeni yeni ortaya çıkmakta ve teknolojik gelişmelerle birlikte de hızla ilerlemekte ve değişmektedir. Hızla değişen ve gelişen bir alanı düzenlemek, elbette onun karakterine, işleyişine ve pek tabii yenilikçi yapısına zarar verebilir. Bu nedenle, rekabeti bozucu ve zararlı olabilecek, aceleci bir ex-ante düzenleme çabası yerine, bu tarz iddialı adımlar atmadan önce tüm alternatif yöntemlerin sonuna kadar değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu durumda, iyi tanımlanmış ve düzgün uygulanan bir ex-post yöntem, dijital sektördeki rekabet sorunlarının çözümünde daha iyi bir alternatif haline gelebilmektedir. Sonuç olarak bu makale, dijital sektöre yönelik ulusal düzeyde son dönemde yapılan rekabet müdahalelerinin sektörde mevcut rekabet sorunlarına karşı oldukça doğru ve etkili göründüğünü ileri sürmektedir. Uzun vadede yenilik ve gelişmeyi engelleyebilecek bir ex-ante düzenleme yerine, ex-post bir düzenleme mevcut duruma uygun bir çözüm olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rekabet, Yapısal Çözümler, Ex-post Düzenleme, Dijital Sektör, Çevrimiçi Platformlar, Dijital Piyasalar Yasası

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