Bu makalede, fıkıh usulü eserlerinde istishabın delil değeri incelenirken, “Hanefîler’e göre istishap mevcut hakların korunmasında (def‘i) geçerli bir delildir, fakat yeni hakların kazanılmasında (ispat) geçerli değildir; Şâfiîler’e göre ise her iki durumda geçerli bir delildir” şeklinde ifade edilen usul ihtilafının örneklendirilmesinde tekrar edilegelen bir yanlışlığa dikkat çekilerek bu durumun düşündürdükleri üzerinde durulmaktadır. Özellikle Hanefî usul eserleriyle yakın dönem fıkıh usulü ders kitaplarının birçoğunda ve bazı çağdaş bilimsel yayınlarda yaygın biçimde görülen bilgi şöyledir: Gerek Hanefîler’e gerekse Şâfiîler’e göre mefkudun malları -mefkudun öldüğü ortaya çıkmadan veya mahkemece ölümüne karar verilmeden önce- mirasçıları arasında bölüştürülmez (İstishap def‘ide hüccettir); fakat mefkudun bu durumu açıklık kazanıncaya kadar geçen süre içinde vefat eden yakınlarına mirasçı olup olamayacağı hususunda bu iki mezhep farklı görüşe sahiptir: Şâfiîler’e göre mirasçı olur (İstishap ispatta da hüccettir), Hanefîler’e göre mirasçı olamaz (İstishap ispatta hüccet değildir). Bu mezheplerin usul ve fürû kaynakları üzerinde yaptığımız incelemeler ise her iki mezhebin, belirtilen durumda mefkud “Mirasçı olur” veya “Mirasçı olamaz” şeklinde bir sonuca varmayıp, durumu açıklık kazanıncaya kadar miras payının koruma altına alınması noktasında birleştiğini ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca Hanefî fürû eserlerinde yaygın biçimde yer alan, “Mefkud kendi hakları konusunda sağ, başkalarının hakları konusunda ölü hükmündedir” şeklindeki kalıp ifadenin ikinci önermesinin bu yanlış ezberin pekişmesine katkı sağlamış olabileceği üzerinde de durulmuştur.
Mefkud istishap def‘i ispat miras mirasçı vâris miras bırakan mûris miras engelleri
When one examines the evidence of “istiṣḥāb” (presumption of continuity of a legal status quo ante), a widely discussed concept in Islamic legal theory, one notices that this concept is connected to the principle “al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi al-shakk” (a certainty is not removed by doubt). This principle’s place in Islamic law can be explained as “to presume the continuity of a past condition—unless a proof is found otherwise,” or, stated more succinctly, “to presume a matter to stay as it was.” This article does not intend to discuss this principle (the fourth article of Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye)—which is one of the five universal principles encompassing the whole of Islamic jurisprudence according to some jurists—but rather aims to draw attention to a misconception in an axiomatically repeated example referenced while discussing the evidential value of “istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl,” which is presented as a kind of istiṣḥāb. It also evaluates the implications of this misconception.
A commonly referenced jurisprudential debate suggests that, “According to the Hanafīs, istiṣḥāb is a valid proof for preserving (dafʿ) outcomes depending on the preexisting conditions but is not valid for the occurrence of new conditions (ithbāt); whereas according to the Shafiʿīs, it is valid for both.” An oft-cited example includes the case of a missing person (mafqūd) who left his own residential area and whose wellbeing and status are unknown. The question in this case lies in whether this missing person can inherit property and whether others can inherit the missing individual’s property while he is still absent. Many Hanafī textbooks on the principles of legal theory, as well as recent textbooks on Islamic law, reiterate the following statement: For both the Hanafīs and the Shafiʿīs, the property of the missing person cannot be divided among heirs until the death of the missing person is verified or the court declares the individual dead (istiṣḥāb is valid in dafʿ). However, the two schools hold diverging positions as to whether the missing person can inherit the property of his deceased relatives while he is still missing. According to the Shafiʿīs, the missing person can inherit from them (istiṣḥāb is valid even in the ithbāt), whereas the Hanafīs maintain that the missing person cannot inherit from them (istiṣḥāb is not valid in the ithbāt).
This study concludes that the commonly transmitted example of the heirship of a missing person seems to be “a misplaced presumption,” though it has survived to the present through centuries of repetition. The study also examines the widely repeated Hanafī statement that “the missing person is alive for the missing individual’s own rights but dead for others’ rights,” and suggests that the second part of this statement is not a sound expression, but has contributed to the entrenchment of this misplaced presumption.
In fact, it seems that both Hanafī and Shafiʿī jurists (and even jurists belonging to the other two schools) applied extensive reasoning in understanding the matter, and almost all of them agreed that the same rules would not apply to both regular heirs and the missing person whose status is still unknown. They emphasized that, considering the missing person might still be alive, the highest possible amount of the person’s share as per inheritance regulations should be reserved and protected until the condition of the missing person is clarified. There seems to be no disagreement among the schools’ positions on this subject.
The present research has concluded that the starting point for the position attributed to al-Shafʿī and Shafiʿī scholars on the heirship of a missing person to the one’s deceased relatives—who died while their relative was missing—is based on a statement in al-Dabūsī’s book titled Taqwīm al-adilla. However, his statement is not “according to al-Shafiʿī” or “according to the Shafiʿīs,” but rather is “according to one or some of the Shafiʿī scholars.” Therefore, after a while, to explain the methodological divergence between the schools, Hanafī works on legal theory began circulating the idea that the missing person can inherit from one’s relatives according to the Shafiʿīs, while he cannot do so according to the Hanafīs.
The article classifies the Hanafī works on legal theory after al-Sarakhsī under three categories: a) those that prefer not to mention the matter of heirship of the missing person as an example, b) those that cite this example only to explain the Hanafī position, and c) those that give space to this example in order to compare the Hanafī and Shafiʿī methodological approaches.
mafqūd istiṣḥāb dafʿ inheritance heir inheritor uṣūl al-fiqh furūʿ al-fiqh
Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
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Konular | Din Araştırmaları |
Bölüm | Makaleler |
Yazarlar | |
Yayımlanma Tarihi | 9 Şubat 2022 |
Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2022 Sayı: 47 |