Ethnic Heterogeneity and Public Goods Provision

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 70 Sayı: 2, 247 - 266, 31.12.2020

Ugur Ozdemir Y. Alper Ecevit

https://doi.org/10.26650/ISTJECON2020-833105

Öz

The level of public goods provided in a society is important not only because it contributes to social inclusion and strengthens a shared sense of citizenship, but also because it is a fundamental pre-condition for long term growth and development. Studying the determinants of public goods provision levels, hence, becomes an important exercise. The negative association between ethnic heterogeneity and public goods provision is one such robust empirical finding in political science and economics. Despite the abundance of scholarly work on the topic, the causal mechanisms offered in the literature do not pay attention to the political process involved. The rational choice approaches simply model the relationship as a voluntary contribution game. This paper addresses this gap by offering a theoretical mechanism based on a legislative bargaining framework. We also provide a discussion on a potential extension of the framework where ethnic groups are endogenous.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Public Goods, Ethnic Heterogeneity, Legislative Bargaining

Etnik Heterojenlik ve Kamu Malı Teminatı

Öz

Bir toplumdaki kamu malları düzeyi, sadece toplumsal kapsayıcılık ve paylaşılan bir vatandaşlık duygusunu güçlendirmesi açısından değil, uzun vadeli büyüme ve gelişme için temel bir önkoşul olması açısından da önem arzeder. Bu yüzden, kamu malı tedarikini belirleyen etkenler üzerine çalışmalar yapmak oldukça önemli bir çabadır. Etnik heterojenlikle kamu malları tedarik düzeyi arasındaki negatif ilişki de, siyaset bilimi ve ekonomideki bu yöndeki sağlam bir ampirik bulgudur. Konu üzerine yapılmış çalışmaların fazlalığına rağmen, literatürde önerilen nedensellik mekanizmaları, varolan siyasi süreçleri dikkate almamıştır. Rasyonel seçim yaklaşımları bu ilişkiyi basit bir gönüllü katkı oyunu olarak modellemektedirler. Bu makale, yasama meclisi pazarlık oyunu modeline dayalı bir teorik mekanizma önererek literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı hedefliyor. Ayrıca, bu modelin, etnik grupların endojen olduğu genişletilmiş bir halini de tartışıyoruz.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kamu Malları, Etnik Heterojenlik, Yasama Meclisi Pazarlık Oyunları

Kaynakça

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