PARA POLİTİKASININ DÜNÜ VE BUGÜNÜ

Yıl 2010, Sayı: 2, 89 - 97, 20.01.2012

Dilara Mumcu Akan

Öz

OZET

Para politikasına iliskin herhangi bir incelemeden doğan izlenim bu alanın ozellikle son yirmi yılda cok fazla canlılık gostermesi yanında ilginc ve onemli gelismelere yol acmasıdır. Bu mahalde soz konusu olan literature genel bir bakıs sağlamayı amaclamaktadır. Burada teorik gelismeleri ve bunların fiili uygulamalarını goz onune alacağız. Ayrıca gercek dunyadaki gelismeler de akademik literature cok sayıda ilavelerde bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Para Politikası, Nakit Okulu, Bankacılık Okulu

Kaynakça

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