INNOVATION, POWER AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: A DYNAMIC HETEROGENEOUS APPROACH FOR OECD COUNTRIES

Öz

This paper analyzes the impact of technological innovations on income distribution in OECD countries over the period 1981-2023. The literature on the impact of innovations on income inequality often uses the number of patents distributed by application year. However, the primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the power generated by the concentration of innovations through various strategies on income inequality. Therefore, the ratio of private sector R&D investments to public sector R&D investments was used as an indicator of this concentration. The results of the analysis using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator support theoretical approaches suggesting that the increasing dominance of corporate capital over technological innovation exacerbates income inequality in the long run. These results demonstrate the need for both legal reforms and policy change to improve income distribution.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• innovation
• power
• income inequality
• heterogeneous panel data analysis

İNOVASYON, İKTİDAR VE GELİR DAĞILIMI: OECD ÜLKELERİ İÇİN DİNAMİK HETEROJEN BİR ANALİZ

Öz

Bu çalışma 1981-2023 dönemi boyunca OECD ülkelerinde teknolojik yeniliklerin gelir dağılımı üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmektir. Yeniklerin gelir eşitsizliği üzerindeki etkisi literatürde çoğunlukla başvuru yıllarına göre dağıtılan patent sayısını kullanılmaktadır. Ancak bu çalışmanın temel amacı yeniliklerin çeşitli stratejilerle yoğunlaşmasının yarattığı gücün gelir eşitsizliğine etkisini araştırmaktır. Bu nedenle özel sektörün AR-GE yatırımlarının kamu sektörü AR-GE yatırımlarına oranı bu yoğunlaşmanın göstergesi olarak kullanılmıştır. Havuzlanmış Ortalama Grup (PMG) tahmincisi ile yapılan analiz sonuçları teknolojik yenilikler üzerinde kurumsal sermayenin artan hakimiyetinin uzun dönemde gelir eşitsizliğini arttırdığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu sonuçlar gelir dağılımını iyileştirmek için hem yasal reformları hem de politika değişiminin gerekliğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• yenilik
• iktidar
• gelir eşitsizliği
• heterojen panel veri analizi

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