Drone Threats to Nuclear Installations During Armed Conflict: Risk-Based Protection Strategies

Öz

Abstract The growing use of unmanned aircraft systems in armed conflict has created new nuclear security challenges for nuclear installations. Drones may support surveillance, unauthorized airspace intrusion, smuggling, operational disruption, and attacks on supporting infrastructure. Their small size, low-altitude operation, increasing autonomy, and evolving payload capacity complicate detection, attribution, and timely response. Fiber-optic-controlled drones add a further challenge because they can reduce the effectiveness of conventional counter-drone measures, particularly radio-frequency detection, jamming, and operator geolocation. This study examines drone threats to nuclear installations during armed conflict and proposes a risk-based framework for strengthening nuclear security resilience. Using a qualitative approach based on international nuclear security guidance, counter-drone literature, and documented conflict-related cases, the framework assesses risk through four variables: threat likelihood, vulnerability, consequence, and protection readiness. The framework is applied to incidents involving the Zaporizhzhia and Chornobyl nuclear facilities. The study finds that effective protection requires layered detection, integrated counter-drone procedures, resilient safety and security systems, legal preparedness, and coordinated response among operators, regulators, law enforcement, military authorities, aviation agencies, and emergency services. The paper contributes a non-sensitive analytical model for evaluating and managing drone threats to nuclear installations in conflict environments.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Armed conflict
• drone threats
• nuclear security

Destekleyen Kurum

University of National and World Economy(UNWE)- Departments of nationals and regional security

Etik Beyan

No financial support was received for this study. Conflict of Interest The author has no conflict of interest. Data Availability This study is based on open-source documents, international guidance, and publicly available reports.

Sırasında Nükleer Tesislere Yönelik Drone Tehditleri:

Öz

Özet Silahlı çatışmalarda insansız hava araçlarının artan kullanımı, nükleer tesisler için yeni nükleer güvenlik zorlukları yaratmıştır. Drone’lar gözetleme, yetkisiz hava sahası ihlali, kaçakçılık, operasyonel aksama ve destek altyapısına yönelik saldırıları destekleyebilir. Küçük boyutları, düşük irtifada çalışabilmeleri, artan otonomileri ve gelişen yük taşıma kapasiteleri; tespit, teşhis ve zamanında müdahaleyi zorlaştırmaktadır. Fiber-optik kontrollü drone’lar ise özellikle radyo frekansı tespiti, karıştırma ve operatör konumlandırması gibi geleneksel karşı-drone önlemlerinin etkinliğini azaltabildikleri için ek bir zorluk oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma, silahlı çatışmalar sırasında nükleer tesislere yönelik drone tehditlerini incelemekte ve nükleer güvenlik dayanıklılığını güçlendirmek amacıyla risk temelli bir çerçeve önermektedir. Uluslararası nükleer güvenlik rehberleri, karşı-drone literatürü ve belgelenmiş çatışma vakalarına dayanan nitel bir yaklaşım kullanılarak, çerçeve riski dört değişken üzerinden değerlendirmektedir: tehdit olasılığı, kırılganlık, sonuç ve koruma hazırlığı. Çerçeve, Zaporijya ve Çornobil nükleer tesislerindeki olaylara uygulanmıştır. Çalışma, etkili korumanın katmanlı tespit sistemleri, entegre karşı-drone prosedürleri, dayanıklı emniyet ve güvenlik sistemleri, hukuki hazırlık ve işletmeciler, düzenleyici kurumlar, kolluk kuvvetleri, askeri otoriteler, havacılık kurumları ve acil durum hizmetleri arasında koordineli müdahale gerektirdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Makale, çatışma ortamlarında nükleer tesislere yönelik drone tehditlerinin değerlendirilmesi ve yönetilmesi için hassas olmayan analitik bir model sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Silahlı çatışma
• nükleer güvenlik
• drone tehditleri

Kaynakça

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