Problems of the Supply Industry in Wholesale Electricity Markets

Öz

In this paper, we investigate the problems in the supply industry in wholesale electricity markets such as supply inadequacy, missing money, market power, and intermittent renewables since they are the main driver of the electricity market evolution. The main contribution of the paper is that it focuses on these problems both individually and holistically. We focus on the causality relationships among the problems. The paper discusses the possible solutions to these problems based on a problem-oriented perspective. Inefficient governance and regulation are the sources of the main problems in the supply industry except the problem of intermittent renewables. The problems of inefficient governance and regulation, inefficient pricing, and intermittent renewables create issues such as supply inadequacy and missing money. Reducing state ownership to sustain competition, establishing capacity markets to complement energy markets, implementing of market-oriented approach, setting up future markets, market monitoring, and a well-functioning network design are major pathways to phase out problems of supply industry.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Wholesale Electricity Markets
• Electricity Market Problems
• Electricity Supply Industry
• Supply Inadequacy

Toptan Elektrik Piyasalarında Üretim Tarafı Sorunları

Öz

Bu makalede, elektrik piyasası dönüşümünün ana itici gücü olmaları nedeniyle; üretim yetersizliği, kayıp para, piyasa gücü ve kesintili yenilenebilir enerji gibi toptan elektrik piyasalarında üretim tarafındaki sorunlar araştırılmıştır. Makalenin literatüre ana katkısı, bu sorunlara hem bireysel hem de bütünsel olarak odaklanmasıdır. Makalede sorunlar arasındaki nedensellik ilişkilerine odaklanılmıştır. Sorun odaklı bir bakış açısına dayalı olarak bu sorunlara olası çözümleri tartışılmıştır. Kesintili yenilenebilir enerji sorunu dışında, etkin olmayan yönetişim ve düzenleme üretim tarafındaki temel sorunların kaynaklarıdır. Yetersiz yönetişim ve yanlış düzenlemeler, verimsiz fiyatlandırma ve kesintili yenilenebilir kaynaklar, arz yetersizliği ve kayıp para gibi sorunları yaratmıştır. Rekabeti sürdürmek için devlet mülkiyetinin azaltılması, enerji piyasalarını tamamlayacak kapasite piyasalarının oluşturulması, piyasa odaklı yaklaşımın uygulanması, vadeli piyasaların oluşturulması, piyasanın izlenmesi ve iyi işleyen bir ağ tasarımı, üretim tarafının sorunlarını aşamalı olarak ortadan kaldırmanın başlıca yollarıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Organize Elektrik Piyasaları
• Elektrik Piyasası Sorunları
• Elekrik Üretim Sektörü
• Arz Yetersizliği

Kaynakça

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