Tunus Telekomünikasyon Piyasasında Mobil Sesli Aramalar ve Tit-For-Tat Oyunu için Fiyat İndirimleri

Yıl 2021, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 1, 64 - 75, 29.06.2021

Safieddine Bouali

Öz

Tunus telekomünikasyon pazarında, 2011-2015 dönemleri arasında mobil telefonlar arası sesli aramalarda yoğun fiyat indirimleri yaşanmıştır. Üç büyük tedarikçi olan Tunisie Télécom, Ooredoo and Orange’un Tit-For-Tat oyununda yoğun fiyat indirimi yaptıklarını veya gelirleri azalsa da aşırı tepki verdiklerini görüyoruz. Bu çalışma, ekonomik literatürde açıklandığı gibi, fiyat dinamiklerinin pazar payı kazanmak için basit bir strateji mi yoksa bir "fiyat savaşı" mı olduğunu araştırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, fiyat esnekliğine, kullanıcı başına ortalama gelire ve fiyat serilerine göre her sağlayıcı için talep eğrileri oluşturulmakta ve ardından gecikmeleri analiz edilmektedir. Saf fiyatlandırma stratejisi, veri trafiğinin hızlı büyümesi ve kişi başı harcanabilir gayri safi milli hasılanın azalması bağlamında tartışılmaktadır. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Telekomünikasyon Pazarı, Oligopol, Sesli Telefon Hizmetleri, Saf Fiyat Stratejisi, Fiyat Savaşı

Price-cuts for the Mobile Voice Calls and the Tit-For-Tat Game on the Tunisian Telecommunication Market

Öz

The Tunisian telecommunication market experienced intense price-cuts of the mobile-to-mobile voice phone services throughout the 2011-2015 period. This paper shows that the three major providers, Tunisie Télécom, Ooredoo and Orange, have replicated the price-cuts as in the Tit-For-Tat game or over-reacted despite the hurt of their revenues. This paper investigates whether price dynamics is a simple strategy for gaining market share or a “price war”, as described in the economic literature. This paper constructs the demand curves for each provider based on price-elasticity, average revenue per user and price series, and then we analyze their lags. The pure pricing strategy is discussed as it coincided with the fast growth of data traffics and the decrease of the gross national disposable income per capita.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Telecommunication Market, Oligopoly, Voice phone services, Pure Price Strategy, Price War

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