Yönetişim Kalitesi Sahra Altı Afrika Ülkelerinde Vergi Gayretini Etkiliyor mu?

Yıl 2021, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 2, 414 - 434, 30.12.2021

Hamdi Furkan Günay Mehmet Hanefi Topal

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Sahra Altı Afrika (SAA) ülkelerinde yönetişim kalitesinin vergi gayreti üzerindeki etkisini ampirik olarak incelemektir. Bu doğrultuda 37 SAA ülkesinin 2002-2015 dönemini kapsayan verileri geleneksel panel veri modelleri ve Sistem Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Metodu (Sys-GMM) tahmincisi ile araştırılmıştır. Daha önceki çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışmada hem Dünya Bankası’nın altı yönetişim göstergesinin hem de bütünleştirilmiş yönetişim endeksinin vergi gayreti üzerindeki etkisi analiz edilmiştir. Ampirik bulgular SAA ülkelerinde bütünleşik yönetişimin ve her bir yönetişim göstergesinin vergi gayretini pozitif etkilediğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca güçlendirilmiş ampirik bulgular SAA ülkelerinde ifade özgürlüğü ve hesap verebilirlik ile hukukun üstünlüğü gibi demokrasi temsillerinin vergi gayretini daha önemli belirleyicileri olduğunu da ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Vergi Eforu, Yönetişim Kalitesi, Sahra Altı Afrika, System-GMM

Does Quality of Governance Affect Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Öz

This study aims to empirically analyze the impact of governance quality on tax effort in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Based on a dataset for 37 SSA countries over the time period of 2002-2015, the governance and tax effort relationships is examined by using conventional panel data models and system-generalized method of moment (Sys-GMM) estimators. Unlike previous studies, this study analyzes the impact of both six governance indicators of the World Bank and the composite quality of governance index on tax effort. The empirical findings indicated that composite governance and all of the governance indicators positively affect tax effort in SSA countries. The robust empirical findings also indicate that democracy representatives such as voice and accountability and the rule of law are relatively more important determinants of tax effort in SSA countries.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tax effort, quality of governance, Sub-Saharan Africa, System-GMM

Kaynakça

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