A PLAY-and-WIN GAME APPROACH FOR DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIES USED IN GAME THEORY

Öz

In the present study, voluntary people of different age groups consisted of children, youngs, adults and olds were asked to play a simple play-and-win game and the results of the games were analyzed to reveal how they behaved in the games to maximize their winning performances. The games were played in two different forms to represent one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). The results showed that age groups in IPD game did not differ from each other in the numbers of games won. On the other hand, gender differences were significant in the children and young groups. Males in children group and females of the youngs group were better in winning a game. In the PD game, the age groups and the genders in these age groups did not differ from each other in the numbers of games won. The evaluation of behaviors of players in general showed that a TIT-FOR-TAT strategy was used by players in combination with pure cooperation to maximize their winnings. We conclude, based on the overall results that cooperation may be the optimal strategy for individual and group success for establishment and maintenance of social dynamics and relationships. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Game Theory
• Cooperation
• Altruism

Kaynakça

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