Kamu borçlanmasının politik iktisadi temelleri

Öz

Maliye politikası araçları; hane halkları, bölgeler ve kuşaklararası bir yeniden dağıtım mekanizması olduğundan politik tartışmaların merkezinde kalmıştır. Özellikle, 1929 Buhranından sonra hükümetin geliri yeniden dağıtıcı rolü önem kazanmıştır. Diğer yandan; maliye politikası uygulamalarının yarattığı bütçe açıkları, söz konusu açıkların büyük ölçüde borçlanma yolu ile finanse edilmesi ve buna bağlı olarak hükümetlerin borç yükümlülüklerinde meydana gelen sürekli artışlar, borçlanmanın ekonomi üzerinde yarattığı etkileri önemli kılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, uzun bir süre boyunca hükümetlerin uyguladıkları politikalardan ziyade belirli iktisadi amaçları gerçekleştirmek adına hangi politikaları izlemesi gerektiği analiz edilmiştir. Ancak bu analizler aynı iktisadi koşullara sahip ülkelerin bütçe açığı, enflasyon ve borç dinamiklerinin birbirlerinden farklılık göstermesi durumunu tam olarak açıklayamamaktadır. İktisadi açıdan birçok konuda benzerlik gösteren ülkelerin kurumsal ve politik açılardan; seçim yasaları, siyasi partilerin yapısı, bütçe kanunları, merkez bankaları, politik istikrarsızlık ve sosyal kutuplaşma gibi birçok farklılıkları bulunmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, bütçe açıkları ve borç stokunda meydana gelen değişimlerin analiz edilmesinde politik süreç içerisindeki kurumsal farklılıkların göz önünde bulundurulması gerekliliği ortaya çıkmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı kamu borçlanmasının nedenlerinin politik iktisat yaklaşımları çerçevesinde ortaya koyulmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Maliye Politikası,Borçlanma,Politik İktisat

Political economic foundations of government debt

Öz

Fiscal policy tools have long been at the center of political debates due to being redistribution mechanism between households, regions and generations. In particular, income redistributive role of the governments gained importance after the 1929 Crisis. On the other hand; the fiscal deficits created by fiscal policy implementations, the financing of these deficits mostly through borrowing and the continuous increases in the debt obligations of the governments make the effects of government debt on the economy important. It has been analyzed for a long time which policies should be followed by the governments in order to achieve certain economic goals rather than policies governments implemented. However, these analyses do not fully explain the differences between the budget deficit, inflation and debt dynamics of the countries in which have the same economic conditions. There are many institutional and political differences such as election laws, the structure of political parties, budget laws, central banks, political instability and social polarization between countries, which are similar in terms of economic aspect. In this context, the necessity for considering the institutional differences in the political process in analyzing the changes in budget deficits and debt stock has arisen. The aim of this study is to reveal the reasons for public borrowing within the framework of political economy approaches.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Fiscal Policy,Government Debt,Political Economy

Kaynakça

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