IN THE MULTIPLAYER PRISONER'S DILEMMA, A PLAYER EMPLOYING A ZERO-DETERMINANT STRATEGY SECURES ADVANTAGEOUS OUTCOMES FOR THE ENTIRE GROUP.

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 2, 142 - 160, 31.07.2023

Ahmad Ali Mehrad , Serkan Ali Düzce

https://doi.org/10.33773/jum.1259124

Öz

When there is an interaction between the level of choice of an individual and a group, there is no favorite but to refer to the problem of a multi-member prisoner's dilemma game. Also in real life, there is a widespread need for cooperation or defection amongst a group of population in the matter of choice. The problem of multiplayer prisoner's dilemma is widely used in real life. We conducted this study to find out how people cooperate in a multiplayer interaction in the prisoner's dilemma game. In this study, we examine the interaction between an individual and a group of population and look for the Zero-Determinant strategies in the case of multiplayer prisoner's dilemma game.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Interaction, Cooperation, Evolution of Cooperation, Multi-player Prisoner, Zero-Determinant Strategies.

Destekleyen Kurum

Eskisehir Technical University

Kaynakça

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