Büyük Güç Statüsü Hedefinde Rusya: Sahraaltı Afrika Politikası Örneği

Öz

Rusya Federasyonu 2000’li yıllarda güç kazandıkça, Kremlin tek kutuplu uluslararası sisteme yönelik eleştirilerini yoğunlaştırmış ve içerisinde büyük güç statüsünde yer alacağı çok kutuplu bir sistemi desteklemiştir. Bu doğrultuda büyük güç olarak tanınmak için yüksek statüye sahip devletlere güçlü oldukları alanlarda meydan okumayı ve onları aşmayı hedefleyen sosyal rekabet stratejisini benimsemiştir. Bu çalışma Rusya’nın Sahraaltı Afrika politikasına odaklanmakta ve sosyal rekabet stratejisi ile uyumlu olarak Rusya’nın güvenliğiyle doğrudan ilgisi olmamasına ve görece zayıf tarihi bağlara sahip olmasına rağmen bu bölgede büyük bir nüfuza sahip olan ve büyük güç olarak algılanan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Fransa gibi ülkelerle rekabet ettiğini tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Rusya’nın bölgedeki nüfuzunu artırmak için izlediği politika ve yürüttüğü faaliyetler güçlü ve zayıf yönleri ile birlikte analiz edilmektedir. Makalede, Rusya’nın ekonomik kısıtlarının onun nüfuz alanını sınırlandırdığı ve Moskova’nın bunu askeri iş birliği anlaşmaları, Batı-karşıtı anlatı, dezenformasyon faaliyetleri ve Rusya’nın çıkarları ile uyumlu liderlere siyasi desteği vasıtasıyla telafi etmeye çalıştığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rus dış politikası
• Sahraaltı Afrika
• statü
• çok kutupluluk

RUSSIA’S QUEST FOR GREAT POWER STATUS: THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA POLICY

Öz

As the Russian Federation gained power in the 2000s, the Kremlin intensified its criticisms of the unipolar international system and argued for a multipolar system in which it would have a great power status. In order to be recognized as a great power, it has espoused the social competition strategy which seek to challenge and surpass those in high-status states in areas where they are powerful. This study focuses on Russia’s Sub-Saharan Africa policy and discusses that in line with social competition strategy even though the region is not directly linked to its security and with which it has relatively weak historical ties, Russia has been competing with the countries like the United States and France that are perceived as great powers and have a major influence in the region. In this context, the policies and activities that Russia has pursued to bolster its influence in the region are analyzed together with its strengths and weaknesses. In the article, it is argued that Russia’s economic constraints limit its sphere of influence, and Moscow attempts to compensate for this through military cooperation agreements, anti-Western narratives, disinformation activities and political support to the leaders whose policies align with Russian interests.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Russian foreign policy
• Sub-Saharan Africa
• status
• multipolarity

Kaynakça

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