KARADENİZ’DE GÜÇ PROJEKSİYONU VE BÖLGESEL GÜVENLİK DİNAMİKLERİ

Öz

Tarih boyunca stratejik konumu ve jeoekonomik potansiyeli nedeniyle bir rekabet alanı olan Karadeniz, 1922’de Sovyetler Birliği’nin, 1923’te ise Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kurulmasıyla iki bölgesel aktörün etkisi altına gir-miştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Karadeniz’in Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde değişen güvenlik mimarisini güç rekabeti, bölgesel güvenlik dinamikleri ve Karadeniz’e kıyıdaş ülkelerin askerî güç projeksiyonu bağlamında analiz etmektir. Araştırmanın temel sorusu, Karadeniz güvenliğinin hangi aktörler tarafından ve hangi kapasite düzeyinde sürdürülebi-leceğidir. Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi, barış ve savaş dönemlerinde bölgesel dengeyi sağlayan kritik bir mekanizma işlevi görmüştür. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında NATO’nun bölgeye artan ilgisi, 2004 yılında Bulgaristan ve Romanya’nın NATO’ya, 2007 yılında ise Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olmaları ile Ukrayna ve Gürcistan’a yönelik ortaklık politikaları Kara-deniz’deki jeopolitik dengeleri dönüştürmüştür. Bu süreçte Rusya’nın 2008 Gürcistan, 2014 Kırım ve 2022 Ukrayna müdahaleleri, Karadeniz’i büyük güçler arası bir güç mücadelesine taşımıştır. Çalışma, nitel araştırma yöntemiyle NATO ve Avrupa Birliği perspektiflerini, Karadeniz’e kıyıdaş ülkelerin askerî ve ekonomik güç verilerini karşılaştırma-lı olarak incelemektedir. Bulgular, Karadeniz güvenliğini millî güç unsurlarıyla sürdürülebilir biçimde sağlayabilecek kapasitenin esas itibarıyla Türkiye ve Rusya’da bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma, 1991-2025 arası açık kay-naklı askerî veriler, resmî açıklamalar, uzman görüşleri ve istatistiksel verilerle yapılan analizlerle sınırlıdır. Askerî güç karşılaştırmalarının literatürde ilk kez istatistiksel tablolar hâlinde sunulması, çalışmanın özgün katkısını oluşturmak-tadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Karadeniz
• NATO
• Russia
• Türkiye
• Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi.

POWER PROJECTION IN THE BLACK SEA AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Öz

Throughout history, the Black Sea has been an area of sustained rivalry due to its strategic location and geoe-conomic potential. With the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922 and the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, the Black Sea came under the influence of two principal regional actors. The aim of this study is to analyze the changing security architecture of the Black Sea in the post–Cold War period within the context of power rivalry, regional dynamics, and the military power projection capabilities of the Black Sea littoral states. The main research question addresses which actors are capable of sustaining Black Sea security and at what level of capacity. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits has functioned as a critical mechanism for maintaining regional balance during both peace-time and wartime. In the post–Cold War era, NATO’s increasing interest in the region, Bulgaria and Romania’s acces-sion to NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007, as well as partnership policies toward Ukraine and Georgia, have significantly transformed the geopolitical balance in the Black Sea. In this context, Russia’s interventions in Geor-gia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and Ukraine in 2022 have turned the Black Sea into a theater of great power competition. Employing a qualitative research methodology, the study comparatively examines NATO and European Union pers-pectives alongside military capability data and national power elements of the Black Sea littoral states. The findings indicate that only Türkiye and Russia possess the capacity to sustain Black Sea security through their own national power instruments. This study is limited to analyses based on open-source military data, official statements, expert assessments, and statistical sources covering the period from 1991 to 2025. Its original contribution lies in presenting comparative military power assessments in statistical tables for the first time in the literature.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Black Sea
• NATO
• Russia
• Türkiye
• Montreux Convention

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