Ukrayna-Rusya Savaşından Alınan Hava Savunma Dersleri

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 43, 357 - 383, 03.11.2023

Mehmet Gürsu

https://doi.org/10.17134/khosbd.1323714

Öz

Rusya’nın Ukrayna’nın tam ölçekte işgali amacıyla başlattığı savaş, harp silah, sistem ve araçlarının sahnelenmesi; yeni harp konseptlerinin ve taktiklerinin denenmesi, geliştirilmesi ve ihtiyaçların belirlenmesi açısından laboratuvar işlevi görmektedir. Askerî ve ekonomik açıdan Rusya’nın Ukrayna karşısında üstünlüğü olmasına rağmen bir yıldan fazla süredir devam eden savaşta, Batı’nın Ukrayna’ya desteği ile göreli bir dengenin sağlandığı görülmektedir. Bu denge, Batı desteğinin devamına ve Rusya’nın, hava üstünlüğünü kazanamamasına bağlıdır. Ukrayna’nın Yerde Konuşlu Hava Savunma Sistemleri (Ground Based Air Defence Systems, GBAD) şu ana dek Rusya’nın hava savunmasını bastırma ve yok etme (SEAD/DEAD) harekâtını durdurmayı başarmıştır. Böylece Rusya, ağırlıklı olarak Yakın Hava Desteği (CAS) harekâtına yönelmiştir. Ayrıca, gezinen (loitering) İnsansız Hava Aracı (İHA), Silahlı İnsansız Hava Aracı (SİHA), seyir füzesi, balistik füze ve siber saldırılarıyla Ukrayna’nın askerî ve sivil altyapısını da hedef almaktadır.Çalışmada, Rusya’nın hava saldırı taktikleri ile Ukrayna GBAD’lerinin karşı taktikleri incelenmiştir. Bu çerçevede yerden havaya füze sistemlerinin (Surface to Air Missile, SAM) bütünleşik bir komuta kontrol yapısı altında gelişen muharebe şartlarına uygun olarak esnek kullanımı ve bu sistemlerin lojistik desteğindeki devamlılığın harekâta etkileri ele alınmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı, Ukrayna savaşından alınan dersler ışığında GBAD sistemlerinin savaşa hazırlık seviyelerini yükseltecek önlemlerin ortaya konulması ve yeni taktiklerin geliştirilmesine bir temel oluşturmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

GBAD, Entegre Hava ve Füze Savunması, Çok Alanlı Harekât, Ukrayna-Rusya Savaşı.

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