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Öz

The roots of modern agency theory which has been thought to play an important role in causing financial crises can be traced back to the book of Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” published in 1776. Adam Smith stated that the directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money rather than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private [firm] frequently watch over their own. This situation raises the agency theory issue. Agency theory occurs within an agency relationship where a party delegates a party to perform for his own sake. Seperation of ownership and control causes these kind of relationships. This seperation leads to conflicts of interest especially between managers and owners and between creditors and owners. In this study, agency theory emanating from the seperation of ownership and control, conflicts of interest in agency relationships and the costs of these conflicts of interest have been studied in the literature review.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Ownership Structure, Agency Theory, Agency Costs

Sahiplik Yapısı ve Temsilcilik Teorisi

Öz

Son zamanlarda finansal krizlerin oluşmasında önemli bir rol oynadığı düşünülen modern temsilcilik teorisinin kökleri, Adam Smith’in 1776’da yayınlanan “Ulusların Zenginliği” adlı kitabına kadar götürülebilir. Adam Smith (1776) bu çalışmasında, kendilerinin değil de başkalarının paralarının yöneticileri olan şirket yöneticilerden, ortakların kendi mallarına özen gösterdikleri gibi aynı özeni göstermelerinin beklenemeyeceğini ifade etmiştir. Bu durum, ortaya temsilcilik teorisini çıkarmaktadır. Temsilcilik teorisi; bir tarafın, işi gerçekleştirmeleri için başka bir tarafı görevlendirdikleri temsilcilik ilişkisi içinde meydana gelir. Bu ilişkiler, sahiplik ve kontrolün birbirinden ayrılmasıyla meydana gelir. Sahiplik ve kontrolün birbirinden ayrılması, özellikle, sahiplerle yöneticiler ve sahiplerle borç verenler arasında çıkar çatışmalarına sebep olur. Bu çalışmada, dağılmış ve yoğunlaşmış sahiplik yapısı boyutlarında, sahiplik ve kontrolün birbirinden ayrılmasıyla ortaya çıkan temsilcilik teorisi, temsilcilik ilişkilerinden meydana gelen çıkar çatışmaları ve bu çıkar çatışmalarının maliyetleri, literatür incelemesi olarak çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Sahiplik Yapısı, Temsilcilik teorisi, Temsilcilik Maliyetleri

Kaynakça

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