THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Öz

The Euro area debt crisis has not only economic but also political consequences, since it has caused the on-going debates about the extent to which the European Union (EU) political structure is democratic to be more heated, and consequently called the institutional structure of the European Union into question  Dr., Hazine Müsteşarlığı. Makalede ifade edilen görüşler yazarın değerlendirmeleri olup, görev yaptığı kurumla ilişkilendirilemez, e-posta:[e-mail] again. After the crisis broke out, initiatives taken inside and outside the European Union to cope with the effects of the Euro area debt crisis have bestowed a greater role in surveillance of national economic and financial policies on the European Commission. On the economic side, these initiatives which increase powers of the EU’s unelected government may be justified; but on the political side the Commission’s role in the new European economic governance should be paid more attention from the perspective of democracy, since the legitimacy and political accountability of the Commission have always been controversial issues. The aim of this article is to shed some light on the extent to which the European Commission is democratically legitimate and politically accountable and also to clarify why the Euro area debt crisis has caused the on-going debates about democracy at EU level to be more heated.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• European Commission
• representative democracy
• political legitimacy
• political accountability

AVRUPA KOMİSYONU’NUN MEŞRUİYETİ VE SİYASİ SORUMLULUĞU

Öz

Avro alanında yaşanan borç krizinin sadece ekonomik sonuçları değil, aynı zamanda siyasi yansımaları olmuştur. Borç krizinin etkisiyle Avrupa Birliği’nin demokratik niteliği üzerine süregelen tartışmalar daha da derinleşmiş ve özellikle borç krizi sonrası Avrupa Komisyonu’nun artan yetkileri bağlamında, Birliğin kurumsal yapısı tekrar sorgulanmaya başlanmıştır. Zira Avro alanında yaşanan borç krizinin ekonomik etkileri ile mücadele etmek amacıyla Birlik kurumsal çerçevesi içinde ve dışında alınan önlemler Avrupa Komisyonu’nun üye devletlerin ulusal ekonomi ve maliye politikaları üzerindeki yetkilerini artırmıştır. Avrupa Komisyonu’nun üye devletlerin ekonomi ve maliye politikaları üzerinde yetkilerinin artırılması, ekonomik gerekçelerle haklı gösterilebilir; ancak siyasi açıdan bakıldığında, Avro alanı borç krizi sonrası yeniden şekillenen ekonomi yönetimi içinde, meşruiyeti ve siyasi sorumluluğu zaten tartışmalı olan Avrupa Komisyonu’nun artan yetkilerinin, özellikle demokratik meşruiyet açısından dikkatle değerlendirilmesi gerektiği aşikârdır. Bu makalenin amacı, Avrupa Komisyonu’nun demokrasi açısından ne ölçüde meşru ve siyaseten sorumlu bir kurum olduğunu değerlendirmek ve böylelikle Birliğin demokratik niteliği üzerine süregelen tartışmaların Avro alanı borç krizinin etkisiyle derinleşmekte olmasının nedenlerine de açıklık getirmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Avrupa Komisyonu
• temsili demokrasi
• siyasi meşruiyet
• siyasi sorumluluk

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