AVRUPA PARA BİRLİĞİ: ASİMETRİK ŞOK PROBLEMİ ÜZERİNE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Yıl 2011, Cilt: 19 Sayı: 2, 73 - 92, 25.12.2011

Özgün İmre

https://doi.org/10.29228/mjes.139

Öz

Avrupa Para Birliği (APB) kendine has bir şekilde kurulmuştur: para
politikaları merkezileştirilirken mali politikalar İstikrar ve Büyüme Paktı sınırları
içerisinde üye devletlerin yönetiminde bırakılmıştır. Komisyon, APB’nin zaman
içinde bir optimum para sahası haline geleceğini, bu yüzden de mali politikaların
merkezileştirilmesinin gerekmeyeceğini öne sürmüştür. Mali federalizm literatürü
ise bir birlikte, üyelerin diğerlerini olumsuz yönden etkilemeden asimetrik şokları asimile edemeyeceğini, bu yüzden istikrar sağlama politikalarının
merkezileştirilmesini önermektedir. Bu yüzden para politikasının
merkezileştirilmesi mali politikaların da merkezileştirilmesiyle pekiştirilmelidir.
Bu çalışma APB’nin zaman içinde daha simetrik bir yapıya kavuşup
kavuşmadığını araştırmaktadır. Önerilen bir merkezi sigorta mekanizmasıyla,
zaman içinde değişen modelin istikrar sağlama yetisi ve APB’nin asimetrik şoklarla
baş edebilme becerisi bağdaştırılmış ve APB’nin zaman içinde daha simetrik bir
yapı haline geldiği görülmüştür

Anahtar Kelimeler

Avrupa Para Birliği, Optimum Para Sahası, Asimetrik Şoklar, Mali Federalizm

EMU: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASYMMETRIC SHOCK PROBLEM

Öz

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has a unique set up: while the monetary
policy is centralised at the Union-level, the fiscal policies are left to the member
states within the limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Commission
argues that within time EMU would constitute an optimum currency area, and
further centralisation of fiscal policies, thus, is not needed. Fiscal federalism
literature, on the other hand argues that stabilisation functions should be
centralised, since no individual would be able to deal with an asymmetric shock
without harming another member. Therefore the fiscal policy centralisation should
accompany the monetary centralisation.
This study tries to assess whether the EMU has become more symmetric over
time. By proposing a centralised insurance against asymmetric shock, and linking
the trend of the stabilisation provided by the insurance scheme to the ability of
EMU to absorb asymmetric shocks, the results of the study suggests that EMU has
become more symmetric over time

Anahtar Kelimeler

EMU, OCA, Asymmetric Shock, Fiscal Federalism, Jel Codes: C23, E63, H77

Kaynakça

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