Keşif ve Gerekçelendirme Bağlamı Ayrımı Temelinde Feminist Epistemoloji

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 14, 11 - 27, 30.06.2024

Dinçer Çevik

https://doi.org/10.13114/mjh.1420244

Öz

Bilimsel süreçlerin analizi ile ilgili olan ve genellikle Hans Reicbenbach ile anılan keşif ve gerekçelendirme bağlamı ayrımı son dönemde yeniden önemli tartışma başlıklarından birisi olmuştur. Söz konusu ilgi, bir yönüyle feminist epistemoloji kapsamında ele alınan meseleler ile de bağlantılıdır. Keşif ve gerekçelendirme bağlamı ile feminist epistemoloji arasındaki bağlantı noktalarının analizi her iki başlıkta anılan pek çok önerme ve argümanın değerlendirilebilmesi için önemli olanaklar sunmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda giriş kısmından sonra, makalenin ilk bölümünde Hans Reichenbach’ın keşif-gerekçelendirme bağlamı ayrımı tarihsel bir yaklaşımla, farklı yorumlarıyla birlikte analiz edilecektir. Ardından bahsi geçen ayrımın feminist epistemolojiye karşı olan argümanlarda, özellikle ilgili ayrım bağlamında feminist epistemolojiyi eleştiren isimlerden birisi olan Noretta Koertge tarafından nasıl kullanıldığına değinilecektir. Sonrasında, Katheleen Okruhlik ve Paul Hoyningen Huene’nin keşif-gerekçelendirme bağlamı ayrımını ele alışındaki benzerlikler gösterilerek Koertge’nin feminist epistemolojiye karşı çıktığı argümandaki problemler analiz edilecektir. Makale bu anlamda feminist epistemolojinin ve feminist bilim felsefesinin keşif-gerekçelendirme bağlamı ayrımı ile zorunlu olarak uyuşmazlık içinde olmadığı ve bilim pratiği için halen referans noktalarından birisi olabileceği iddiası üzerine kuruludur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Keşif Bağlamı , Gerekçelendirme Bağlamı , Hans Reichenbach , Feminist Epistemoloji.

Kaynakça

• Ahn S. 2020, “How Non-epistemic Values Can be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Volume 84, 57-65. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.002.
• Akbay G. 2014, “Marksizm Bilime Yabancı Mı?” Ed. A. Dizdar. Jacques Monod: Lisenko Vakası, Diyalektik Materyalizm ve Siyaset-Bilim İlişkisi, Yazılama Yayınevi. İstanbul, 88-115.
• Anderson E. 1995, “Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense”. Hypatia. 10 (3), 50–84.
• Anderson E. 2004, How Not to Criticize Feminist Epistemology: Review of Pinnick, Koertge, and Almeder’s Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology. Erişim Tarihi: 04.04.2023. (http://www-personal. umich.edu/%7Eeandersn/hownotreview.html).
• Antony L. 2002, “Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology”. Eds. L. M. Antony & C. Witt, 2nd, A Mind of One’s Own: Essays on Reason and Objectivity, Boulder: Westview, 93-109.
• Aufrecht M. 2011, “The Context Distinction: Controversies Over Feminist Philosophy of Science”. European Journal of Philosophy of Science, (1), 373–392. doi: 10.1007/s13194-011-0031-9.
• Aufrecht M. 2017, “Reichenbach Falls—And Rises? Reconstructing the Discovery/Justification Distinction”. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 31 (2), 151-176. doi: https:/doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2018.1424760
• Bolat D. 2015, “Bilim, Cinsiyet, Nesnellik: Feminist Nesnellik Arayışı Üzerine Bir Tartışma”. Sosyoloji Dergisi, (31), 1-17.
• Curd M. 1980, “The Logic of Discovery: An Analysis of Three Approaches”. Ed. T. NicklesScientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, Dordrecht, 201-19.
• Çevik D. 2022, “Politik Bilim Felsefesi Tartışmalarına Otto Neurath’ın Katkısı”. FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, (34), 259-277. doi: https://doi.org/10.53844/flsf.1117061.
• Çevik D. 2023, “Carnap ve Neurath’ın Feminist Bilim Felsefesi Açısından Olası Bir Değerlendirmesi”. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi. Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, 63(1), 573-605. doi: https://doi.org/10.33171/dtcfjournal.2023.63.1.23
• De Campos L. B. S. N. 2015, “Neurath on Context of Discovery vs Context of Justification”. Argumentos, Revisita de Filosofia, 237-246.
• Dupré J. 2007, “Fact and Value”. Eds. H. Kincaid, J. Dupré, Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions. New York, 24-71.
• Feyerabend P. K. 1970, “Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge”. Ed. M. Radner and S. Winokur, Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 4. Minneapolis, 17–130.
• Haack S. 1993, “Knowledge and Propaganda: Reflections of an Old Feminist”. Partisan Review, 556–564.
• Hacking I. 1999, The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
• Haeley K.C. 2003, Objectivity in The Feminist Philosophy of Science, Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
• Hanson N. R. 1971, “The Idea of a Logic of Discovery”. Ed. N.R. Hanson, What I Do Not Believe and Other Essays, Dordrecht, 288–300.
• Harding S. (ed.). 2008, Sciences from Below: Feminism, Postcolonialism, and Modernities. Duke University Press. Durham.
• Harding S. G. 1986, The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press. Ithaca.
• Howard D. 2006, “Lost Wanderers in the Forest of Knowledge: Some Advice on How to Think About the Relation Between Discovery and Justification”. Eds. J. Schickore, & F. Steinle, Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives On the Context Distinction . Dordrecht, 3-22.
• Howard D. 2011, “The Philosophy of Science and The History of Science”. Eds. S. French and J. Saatsi, The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. London, 55-71.
• Hoyningen-Huene P. 2006, “Context of Discovery Versus Context of Justification and Thomas Kuhn”. Eds. J. Schickore and F. Steinle, Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on The Context Distinction. Dordrecht, 119-131.
• Hoyningen-Huene P. 1987, “Context of Discovery and Context of Justification”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (18), 501–515.
• Jarovsky D. 1970, The Lysenko Affair. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
• Kitcher P. 2011a, Science in a Democratic Society. Prometheus Books. Amherst, NY.
• Kitcher P. 2011b, The Ethical Project. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
• Koertge N. 1993, “Ideology, Heuristics and Rationality in the Context of Discovery”. Eds. S. French & H. Kamminga, Correspondence, Invariance, and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post. Dordrecht, 125-136.
• Koertge N. 2003a, “Gender and the Genealogy of Scientific Discoveries”. Eds. C. Pinnick, N. Koertge & R. Almeder, Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology: An Examination of Gender in Science. New Brunswick, 47-64.
• Koertge N. 2003b, “Feminist Values and the Value of Science”. Eds. C. Pinnick, N. Koertge & R. Almeder, Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology: An Examination of Gender in Science. New Brunswick, 222-233.
• Kukla R. 2008, “Naturalizing Objectivity”. Perspectives on Science, 16 (3), 285-302. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc.2008.16.3.285
• Longino H. 1990, Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton University Press. Princeton.
• Morales J. A. & Delgado M.M. 2016, “The Discovery/Justification Context Dichotomy Within Formal and Computational Models of Scientific Theories: A Weakening of the Distinction Based on the Perspective of Non-
• Monotonic Logics”. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 26 (4), 315-335.
• Mowry B. 1985, “From Galen’s Theory to William Harvey’s Theory: A Case Study in the Rationality of Scientific Theory Change”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16 (1), 49–82.
• Nelson L. H. 1990, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Temple University Press. Philadelphia.
• Nelson L. H. 1993, “Who Knows? What Can They Know? And When?”. Reason Papers, (18), 45–56.
• Nelson L. H. 1995, “The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology”. Hypatia, 10(3), 31-49. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00736.x
• Neurath O. 1983, Philosophical papers 1913-1946. Translated and Edited by R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath. Reidel. Dordrecht.
• Nickles T. 1980, “Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the Future of Philosophy of Science” Ed. T. Nickles, Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality: Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science Vol. 56. Dordrecht, 1-59.
• Okruhlik K. 1994, “Gender and the Biological Sciences”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, (20), 21-42. doi: 10.1080/00455091.1994.10717393.
• Putnam H. 2002, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
• Reichenbach H. 1938, Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Chicago University Press. Chicago, IL.
• Richardson A. 2006, “Freedom in a Scientific Society: Reading the Context of Reichenbach’s Contexts”. Eds. J. Schickore and F. Steinle, Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction. Dordrecht, 41-54.
• Richardson S. S. 2010, “Feminist Philosophy of Science: History, Contributions, and Challenges”. Synthese, (177), 337–362. doi: 10.1007/s11229-010-9791-6.
• Schickore J. 2022, Scientific Discovery. Erişim Tarihi: 04.04.2023. (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/scientific-discovery/).
• Sugden R. 2000, “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics”. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1), 1-31. doi:http s://doi.org/10.1080/135017800362220.
• Sugden R. 2002, “Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics”. Ed. U. Mäki, Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction. Cambridge 107-136.
• Sugden R. 2009, “Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms”. Erkenntnis Vol. 70, (1), 3-27. doi: 10.1007/s10670-008-9134-x.
• Szapuová M. 2021, “Quinean Inspiration in Feminist Epistemology: On the Potential Alliance Between Naturalism and Feminism”. Filosofický časopis, Special Issue, 28- 43.
• Uebel T. 2000, “Logical and Empricism and the Sociology of Science: The Case of Neurath and Frank”. Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers v.67, 138-150.
• Uebel T. 2007, Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Viena Circle’s Protocol-Sentence Debate. Open Court. Chicago.
• Yap A. 2022, “Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism”. Eds. David Bordonaba Plou, Víctor Fernández Castro & José Ramón Torices, The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Reflections on Social Injustice and Oppression. Berlin, Boston, 31-52.