TÜRK REKABET HUKUKUNDA PARA CEZALARI: PİYANGO BİTTİ Mİ?

Yıl 2012, Sayı: 52, 45 - 96, 01.12.2012

Harun Gündüz

Öz

Temel amaçları, teşebbüsleri rekabete aykırı davranışlarda bulunmaktan caydırmak olan para cezaları, rekabet otoritelerinin elindeki en önemli araçlardan bir tanesidir. Söz konusu amacın gerçekleştirebilmesi için gerekli olan ceza miktarının belirlenmesi sürecinde, rekabet otoriteleri birçok sorunla karşılaşmaktadırlar. Gelişmiş rekabet hukuku sistemlerinde, para cezalarına ilişkin ikincil mevzuatların kabul edilmesi, söz konusu sorunların çözümünde kritik bir öneme sahiptir. Türk rekabet hukukunda, yakın zamanda kabul edilen Para Cezaları Yönetmeliği, bu yaklaşımın bir ürünü olarak görülmektedir. Söz konusu Yönetmelik, para cezalarının belirlenmesi sürecinde şeffaflık, tutarlılık ve nesnellik sağlamayı amaçlamasının yanı sıra daha caydırıcı para cezalarının uygulanabilmesine de olanak tanımaktadır. Bu çalışmada temel olarak, anılan Yönetmeliğin bahsi geçen şeffaflık, tutarlılık ve nesnellik amaçlarını ne ölçüde gerçekleştirdiği ve beklentilere ne oranda karşılık verdiği, Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku uygulamasıyla karşılaştırmalı olarak irdelenmektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Para Cezaları, Yönetmelik, Gerekçe Gösterme, İlgili Ciro, Tekerrür

FINES IN TURKISH COMPETITION LAW: HAS THE LOTTERY ENDED?

Öz

Monetary fines are one of the most important weapons at the competition authorities’ disposal. Their main task is to deter undertakings from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. In determining the appropriate level of fines in order to achieve this task, competition authorities encounter wide range of issues. In the advanced competition law regimes, adoption of a secondary legislation as to the method for setting fines is a crucial step in dealing with these issues. Recently introduced Fining Regulation in Turkish competition law clearly reflects this idea. Apart from aiming at providing transparency, consistency, and objectivity as to the methodology for setting fines, the Fining Regulation also allows for the imposition of more deterrent level of fines compared to pre-regulation era. Within this context, it is primarily questioned in this paper whether the Fining Regulation has fulfilled its objectives of providing transparency, consistency, and objectivity in the determination of fines. In doing so, a comparative approach will be adopted to consider both the EU and Turkish competition law

Anahtar Kelimeler

Fines, Guidelines, Statements of Reasons, Relevant Turnover, Recidivism

Kaynakça

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• Final rate of the fine was stated in the press release, not in the official decision. It is understood from the decision that the infringement takes place between 1.7.2008 and 15.7.2009, which is slightly over a year. Hence the starting rate should have been increased by 50%.
• It is stated in the decision that retaliatory measures were adopted by the conspirators. Therefore, these measures, which are seen as one of the most serious aggravating factors by the European Commission (See Geradin and Henry 2005, p. 444-445), could have been taken into account. Turkish Pharma cists’ Associ- ation ? 220 ? ? 221 ? Peugeot Dealers I Price fixing, allocation of territories ? ? 224 within gross revenues (Discount for 2 parties but the rate not disclosed)
• It is stated in the decision that the evidences belonged to the time period between 9.3.2009 and 3.11.2009 but also they indicated that the infringement covered 2010.
• Similar to the Sivas Driving Schools and the Peugeot Dealers I cases, retaliatory measures were adopted by the conspirators. Therefore, it could have been considered as an aggravating factor. It is be inferred from the decision that the infringements began in December 2007 and April 2009.