TÜRK HUKUKUNDA REKABET İHLALLERİNE İLİŞKİN TAZMİNAT DAVALARINDA PASSING-ON SAVUNMASI VE DOLAYLI ALICI KURALININ UYGULANMASI: ABD VE AB UYGULAMALARI IŞIĞINDA DEĞERLENDİRME VE ÖNERİLER

Yıl 2011, Sayı: 48, 3 - 74, 01.12.2011

Kadir Baş

Öz

Bir hâkim durum veya kartelden kaynaklı hukuka aykırı fiyat artışı, çoğu durumda dağıtım zincirinin bir üst seviyesindeki alıcılar tarafından bir alt seviyedeki alıcılara aktarılmaktadır. Fiyat artışının bu şekilde dağıtım zinciri boyunca yansıtılması, hangi alıcı grubunun fiyat artışına karşı tazminat davası açma hakkına sahip olacağının belirlenmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Hanover Shoe ve Illinois Brick kararlarında, ABD Yüksek Mahkemesi, rekabet ihlallerine ilişkin tazminat davalarının caydırıcılık amacını tazmin etme amacından üstün tutarak passing-on savunmasını reddedip fiyat artışına karşı yalnızca doğrudan alıcılara dava açma hakkı vermiştir. AB Komisyonu ise, AB Adalet Divanı’nın tazmin etme amacını öne çıkardığı Courage ve Manfredi kararlarını temel alarak passing-on savunması ve dolaylı alıcı kuralının her ikisine de izin vermiştir. Türkiye’de de passing-on savunması ve dolaylı alıcı kuralı açısından, rekabet hukukunun özel hukuk alanında daha etkin uygulanmasına hizmet edici bir politikanın oluşturulması gerekmektedir. Bu makale, ABD ve AB’deki tartışma ve uygulamalardan yararlanmak suretiyle konuya ilişkin bazı değerlendirme ve politika önerileri sunmayı amaçlamaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Passing-on Savunması, Dolaylı Alıcı Kuralı, Rekabet

THE APPLICATION OF PASSING-ON DEFENCE AND INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE IN ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS IN TURKISH LAW: THE ASSESSMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE US AND THE EU PRACTICES

Öz

An illegal overcharge stemming from monopolisation or cartelisation is in most cases passed by purchasers at an upper level of a distribution chain on those at the lower one. Such transmission of the overcharge through distribution chain gives rise to certain difficulties when determining which purchaser group is entitled to bring an action for damages against the overcharge. In Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick decisions, the US Supreme Court rejected the passingon defence and provided the standing to sue for overcharge only to direct purchasers by giving priority to the deterrence objective of antitrust damages actions over its compensation objective. Based on Courage and Manfredi decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU that highlighted the compensation objective, the European Commission, in the White Paper, suggested a policy recognising both the passing-on defence and the indirect purchaser standing. There is a need to establish a policy on the passing-on defence and the indirect purchaser rule in Turkey in order to ensure the well-functioning of private antitrust enforcement system. This article aims to evaluate the issue comprehensively and provide some policy suggestions through benefiting from the debate and practices in the US and the EU

Anahtar Kelimeler

Passing-on Defence, Indirect Purchaser Rule, Antitrust Violations

Kaynakça

• ABA (1983), “Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review Proposed Legislation to Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick”, Antitrust Law Journal, No:52, s.841-882.
• ABA (1991), “Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court’ Decision in California v. ARC America Corp.”, Antitrust Law Journal, No:59, s.273-316.
• ABA (1995), “Report of the Indirect Purchaser Task Force”, Antitrust Law Journal, No:63, s.993-1004.
• ANTITRUST MONDERNIZATION COMMISSION (2007), “Reports and Recommendations”.
• ARKAN, S. (2003), Ticaret İşletme Hukuku, Yedinci Baskı, Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku Araştırma Enstitüsü, Ankara.
• BAKER, D.I. (2004), “Revisiting History- What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others”, Loyola Consumer Law Review, No:16, s.379-408.
• BENSTON, G.J. (1986), “Indirect Purchasers’ Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule”, Antitrust Law Journal, No: 55, s.213-252.
• BEYAZ KİTAP, European Commission (2008), White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Com(2008)165 final, Brussels.
• BEYAZ KİTAP ÇALIŞMA RAPORU, European Commission (2008), Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Brussels.
• BOGE, U. ve K. OST (2006), “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement- The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives”, European Competition Law Review, No: 27(4), s.197-205.
• BREIT, W. ve K.G. ELZINGA (1985), “Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning”, the Journal of Law & Economics, No:28, s.405-443.
• CAVANAGH, E.D. (2005), “Illinois Brick: A Look Back and A Look Ahead”, Loyola Consumer Law Review, No:17, s.1-52.
• CENGIZ, F. (2007), “Passing-on Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the Violations of Competition Law: What can the EC Learn from the US”, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, UEA, CCP Working Paper 07-21
• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1462234
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011. COOPER, E.S. ve J.T. PRUD’HOMME (2006), “One More Challenge for the AMC: Repairing the Legacy of Illinois Brick”, University of San Francisco Law Review, No:40, s.675-702. COOPER, J.D. ve D.L. FOSTER (1977), “Report of the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Task Force on Legislative Alternatives Concerning Illinois Brick, Co., v. Illinois”, Antitrust Law Journal, No:46, s.1137-1180.
• CUNEO, J.W. (2005), “Prepared Statement Before Antitrust Modernization Commission”
• http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Cuneo_rev2.pdf
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011. DAVIS, J.P. ve R.H. LANDE (2008), “Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases”, University of San Francisco Law Review, No:42, s.879-918. DAVIS, R.W. (1997), “Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall”, Antitrust Law Journal, No:65, s.375-406.
• DE SMIJTER, E. ve D. O’SULLIVAN (2006), “The Manfredi Judgement of the ECJ and How It Relates to the Commission’s Initiative on EC Antitrust Damage Actions”, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No:2006/3, s.23-26.
• EREN, F. (2009), Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, On Birinci Baskı, Beta, İstanbul.
• EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007), Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios- Final Report, Brussels.
• EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (2006), Opinion on the Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rule, (2006/C 324/01), Brussels. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (2009), “Opinion on the White paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules”, Brussels.
• EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2007), Resolution of 25 April 2007 on the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules”, (2006/2207(INI)), Strasbourg.
• EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2009), Resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, (2008/2154(INI)), Strasbourg.
• EVEN-SHOSHAN, G., D. SLATER ve D. WAELBROECK (2004), “Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in the Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules- Comparative Report”
• http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_cl
• ean_en.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011.
• FOER, A.A. (2003), “Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective”, Buffalo Law Review, No:51, s.1029-1052.
• FOLSOM, R. (2005), “Indirect Purchasers: State Antitrust Remedies and Roadblocks”, Antitrust Bulletin, No:50, s.181-196.
• GAVIL, A.I. (2001), “Federal Judicial Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional Direct and Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation”, the George Washington Law Review, No:69, s.860-901.
• GAVIL, A.I. (2005a), “Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I: Illinois Brick From Inside the Supreme Court”, St. John’s Law Review, No:79, s.553-624.
• GAVIL, A.I. (2005b), “State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for Reforms- Prepared Remarks Before Antitrust Modernization Commission Panel II”, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Gavil_Statement_c
• orrected_6.27.05_version_with_app.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011.
• GIALI, D.J. ve J.T. TOMLIN (2003), “Federalism and the Indirect Purchaser Mess”, George Mason Law Review, No:11, s.157-178.
• GISSER, M.V. (1982), “Indirect Purchaser Suits under State Antitrust Laws: A Detour Around the Illinois Brick Wall”, Stanford Law Review, No:34, s.203- 220. GUSTAFSON
• Modernization Commission”
• http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Gustafson.pdf
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.02.2011. “Prepared Statement Before
• Antitrust HARRIS, R.G. ve L.A. SULLIVAN (1980), “Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, No:128, s.269-360.
• HELLWIG, M. (2007), “Private Damages Claims and the Passing-On Defense in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases- An Economist’s Perspective”, J. Basedow (der.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluver Law International, the Netherlands içinde, s.121-162.
• HERZOG, D.K. (1980), “Recent Developments-A Door in the Illinois Brick Wall- A Functional Equivalent to the Cost-Plus Contract Exception”, Vanderbilt Law Review, No:33, s.481-498.
• HOSEINIAN, F. (2005), “Passing-on Damages and Community Antitrust Policy- An Economic Background”, World Competition, No:28(1), s.3-23.
• HOVENKAMP, H. (1990), “The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-plus Sales”, Harvard Law Review, No:103, s.1717-1731.
• HOVENKAMP, H. (2005), Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, Thomson West, Minnesota, US.
• İNAN, N. (1999), “Rekabet Hukukunun Diğer Disiplinlerle İlişkisi”, Rekabet Kurumu Perşembe Konferansları, Ankara.
• JACOBS, F.G. ve T. DEISENHOFER (2003), “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective”, C.D. Ehlermann ve I. Atanasiu (der), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law içinde, s.187- 227.
• JOYCE, J.M. ve R.H. MCGUCKIN (1986), “Assignment of Rights to Sue Under Illinois Brick: An Empirical Assessment”, Antitrust Bulletin, No:31, s.235-260.
• KILIÇOĞLU, A.M. (2007), Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Sekizinci Baskı, Turhan Kitapevi, Ankara. KLINGSBERG, D. (1988), “Balancing the Benefits and Detriments of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Detrebling, Antitrust Injury, Standing, and Other Proposed Solutions”, Cardozo Law Review, No:9, s.1214-1244.
• KOCAYUSUFPAŞAOĞLU, N. (2008), Borçlar Hukuku Genel Bölüm, Birinci Cilt, Dördüncü Baskı, Filiz Kitapevi, İstanbul.
• KOMNINOS, A.P. (2008), EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, US.
• KORTUNAY, A. (2009), “AB Rekabet Hukukunda Tazminat Davalarına Yönelik Reform Çalışmaları ve Türk Hukuku Bakımından “De Lege Feranda” Düşünceler”, Rekabet Dergisi Cilt:10 Sy:1, s.81-138.
• KURU, B., R. ARSLAN ve E. YILMAZ (2008), Medeni Usul Hukuku Ders Kitabı, Değiştirilmiş 18. Baskı, Yetkin, Ankara.
• LANDES, W.M. ve R.A. POSNER (1979), “Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick”, the University of Chicago Law Review, No: 46, s.602-635.
• LANDES, W.M. ve R.A. POSNER (1980), “The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review
• No: 128, s.1274-1279.
• MEHRA, S.K. (2002), “Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, No: 40, s.275-322.
• MONTAGUE, H.L. (2005), “State Indirect Purchaser Actions in the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement System: Written Testimony before the Antitrust Modernization Commission”
• http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Montague.pdf
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011. MURRAY, C.R. ve B.D. RICHMAN (2007), “Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule”, Duke Law School Research Paper No.155
• http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2331&context=facu lty_scholarship, Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011.
• NOMER, H.N. (1996), Haksız Fiil Sorumluluğunda Maddi Tazminatın Belirlenmesi, Beta, İstanbul.
• OĞUZMAN, M.K. ve M.T. ÖZ (2006), Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, Dördüncü Baskı, Filiz Kitapevi, İstanbul.
• ÖZKAYA, E. (2000), Gabin Davaları, Seçkin Yayınevi, Ankara.
• POLLOCK, E.E. (1966), “Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine”, Antitrust Law Journal, No: 32, s.5-40.
• POSNER, R.A. (2001), “Antitrust in the Economy”, Antitrust Law Journal, No: 68, s.925-944.
• RUBENSTEIN, W.B. (2005), “Understanding the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005”, http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011.
• RÜGGEBERG, J., M.P. SCHINKEL ve J. TUINSTRA (2005), “Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion”, Amsterdam Center for Law& Economics Working Paper No. 2005-02
• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730384, 01.03.2011. Erişim
• Tarihi: SANLI, K.C. (2003), “Türk Rekabet Hukukunda Haksız Fiil Sorumluluğu”, Rekabet Hukukunda Güncel Gelişmeler Sempozyumu-I, Kayseri, s.197-262.
• SANLI, K.C. (2007), Haksız Fiil Hukukunun Ekonomik Analizi: Hukuk ve Ekonomi Öğretisi, Arıkan, Denizli.
• SCHAEFER, E.J. (1975), “Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis”, William. and Mary Law Review, No:16, s.883-936.
• SCHWARTZ, M. ve G.J. WERDEN (1984), “Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations- An Economic Analysis”, Hastings Law Journal, No: 35, s.629-668.
• SAYHAN, İ. (2005), “Rekabet Hukukunda Tazminat Sorumluluğu Bakımından Hukuka Aykırılık Unsuru ve Sorumluluğun Sınırı”, Ankara Barosu Fikri Mülkiyet ve Rekabet Hukuku Dergisi, Cilt.5, Sayı.3, s.29-61.
• SNYDER, E.A. (1985), “Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages”, Journal of Law & Economics, No: 28, s.469-482.
• ŞAHBAZ, A.U. (2008), ABD Uygulaması Işığında Rekabet İhlallerinden Doğan Zararların Tayini ve Tazmini, Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezleri Serisi No: 88, Ankara.
• TULCHIN, D.B. (2005), “State Indirect Purchaser Actions in the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Testimony Before the Antirust Modernization Commission”, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Tulchin.pdf
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011. WILS, W.P.J. (2003), “Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?”, World Competition, No: 26(3), s.473-488.
• YEŞİL KİTAP, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2005), ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ COM (2005) 672 final, Brussels.
• YEŞİL KİTAP ÇALIŞMA RAPORU, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2005), Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Brussels.
• ZWISLER, M.M. (2005), “State Indirect Purchaser Litigation and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission”, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Zwisler.pdf
• Erişim Tarihi: 01.03.2011.