REKABET HUKUKUNDA TEK TARAFLI SÖMÜRÜCÜ DAVRANIŞLAR

Yıl 2010, Sayı: 44, 111 - 164, 01.12.2010

Çiğdem Ünal

Öz

Yüksek pazar gücüne sahip teşebbüslerin pazardaki rekabet yapısı üzerinde etki doğurmaksızın doğrudan tüketicilere zarar veren sömürücü davranışlarının rekabet hukuku çerçevesinde ne şekilde ele alınacağı kavramsal ve uygulamaya dönük tartışmalara neden olmaktadır. Bu tartışmalar nedeniyle, uygulamacılar ve akademisyenler arasında sömürücü davranışlara rekabet hukuku çerçevesinde müdahalenin istisnai koşullarla sınırlı tutulması yönünde bir görüş birliği bulunmaktadır. Ancak, bu koşullara ve yapılacak müdahalenin biçimine ilişkin görüşler rekabet hukukunun ne derece müdahaleci olması gerektiğine yönelik anlayış çerçevesinde değişmektedir. Esas olarak, ‘yüksek pazar gücüne sahip teşebbüslerin sömürücü davranışlarına rekabet hukuku çerçevesinde müdahale edilmeli mi?’ ve ‘Eğer müdahale edilecekse, bu müdahalenin koşulları ve biçimi ne olmalı?’ sorularına yanıt arayan bu çalışmanın ilk bölümünde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde ve Avrupa Birliği’nde sömürücü davranışların ne şekilde ele alındığı incelenmekte ve sömürücü davranışlara rekabet hukuku çerçevesinde müdahale edilmesine yönelik tartışmalara yer verilmektedir. İkinci bölümde Avrupa Birliği içtihadı ışığında sömürücü davranış türleri ve bunlara müdahalenin yaratabileceği sonuçlar açıklanmakta, müdahale koşullarına ve biçimine yönelik genel bir değerlendirme yapılmaktadır. Son bölümde ise, Rekabet Kurulu kararları çerçevesinde sömürücü davranışların yeri incelenmekte ve ikinci bölümde yapılan değerlendirmeler ışığında Türk Rekabet Hukuku uygulaması bakımından çeşitli öneriler ortaya konmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Sömürücü Kötüye Kullanma, Aşırı Fiyat, Haksız Sözleşme Koşulları, Etkinsizlik, Ayrımcılık

UNILATERAL EXPLOITATIVE CONDUCT IN COMPETITION LAW

Öz

The question of how the exploitative conducts of the undertakings having high market power should be evaluated in the scope of competition law raises serious discussions. Due to divergence in those discussions, which have conceptual and practical aspects, there is a consensus of opinion among practitioners and academicians on intervention in the exploitative conducts being limited to exceptional circumstances within the area of competition law. However, the opinions on the circumstances and the method of the intervention are evolving in parallel to the shifting insights on interventionism of the competition law. In the first part of this study, which basically seeks for the answer to the questions ‘Shall the exploitative conducts of the undertakings having high market power be intervened within the scope of competition law?’ and ‘If the answer is affirmative, what should be the conditions and methods of intervention?’, it is assessed that how the exploitative conducts are handled in United States of America and European Union and the discussions on the intervention in the exploitative conducts in competition law are introduced. In the second part, the types of exploitative conduct and the possible results of intervention are explained in the light of European case law and a general assessment is made on the circumstances and methods of the intervention. In the last part, the concept and practice of exploitative conduct in the decisions of the Turkish Competition Board is analyzed and a number of suggestions for the Turkish competition law practice are made in the light of the assessments made in the second part

Anahtar Kelimeler

Exploitative abuse, Excessive price, Unfair Contract Terms, Inefficiency, Discrimination

Kaynakça

• AHLBORN, C., V. DENICOLO, D. GERADIN ve A.J. PADILLA (2006), “DG
• Comp's Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries”. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894466
• AKMAN, P. (2006), “To Abuse, or not to Abuse: Discrimination between
• Consumers”, CCP Working Paper 06-18), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947573
• AKMAN, P. (2008), “‘Consumer Welfare’ and Article 82 EC: Practice and Rhetoric”, CCP Working Paper 08-25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1210802
• AKMAN, P. (2009), “Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?”, CCP Working Paper 09-1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328316
• AKMAN, P. ve L. GARROD (2010), When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?, forthcoming CCP Working Paper 10/04, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578181
• ARMSTRONG, M. (2006), “Price Discrimination”, MPRA Paper no: 4693, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4693/1/MPRA_paper_4693.pdf
• ASLAN, Y. (2007), Rekabet Hukuku Teori, Uygulama ve Mevzuat, Dördüncü
• Baskı, Ekin Kitabevi, Bursa. AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, G. (2000), Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türk Rekabet Hukukunda
• Hâkim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması, Rekabet Kurumu Lisans Üstü Tez Serisi, No: 4, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara. BÜYÜKKUŞOĞLU, B. (2004), Rekabet İktisadı Çerçevesinde Monopson (Tek
• Alıcı), Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezleri Serisi, No:56, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara. CCNCO COMPLAINTS OFFICE (1998), “Cost Allocation and Pricing”, CCNCO
• Research Paper, Canberra. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2005), “DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses”, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf
• EVANS, D.S. ve A.J. PADILLA (2004), “Excessive Prices: Using Economics to
• Define Administrable Legal Rules”, CEMFİ Working Paper, No. 0416.
• FAULL, J. ve A. NIKPAY (1999), The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press
• FLETCHER, A. ve A. JARDINE (2007), “Towards an Appropriate Policy for
• Excessive Pricing”, 12. Annual Competiton Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Florence. FURSE, M. (2008), “Excessive Prices, Unfair Prices and Economic Value: The Law of Excessive Pricing under Article 82 and The Chapter II Prohibition”
• European Competition Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, s. 59-83. GAL, M. (2004), “Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offence in the US and the EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly?”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 49, s. 343-384.
• GEHRIG, T.P. ve R. STENBACKA (2005), “Price Discrimination, Competition and Konkurrensverkent, s. 131-160 and Cons of Price Discrimination içinde
• GERADIN, D. (2007), “The Necessary Limits to the Control of ‘Excessive’
• Prices by Competition Authorities-A View from Europe”, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2007-032. http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/publications/discussionpapers/ 032.pdf
• GERADIN, D. ve N. PETIT (2005), “Price Discrimination under EC
• Competition Law”, Pros and Cons of Price Discrimination içinde, Konkurrensverket, s. 21-63
• GERADIN, D., P. HOFER, F. LOUIS, N. PETIT ve M. WALKER (2005), “The
• Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law” , GCLC Research Papers, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770144
• GERARD, D. (2005), “Price Discrimination under Article 82 (2) (C) EC
• Clearing up the Ambiguities”, GCLC Research Paper http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1113354
• GILO, D. ve Y. SPIEGEL (2007), “Excessive Price Regulation”, 1. Conference of Research Network on Innovation and Competition Policy: Modern
• Approaches in Competition Policy, Mannheim. ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zewdocs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/YossiSpiegel.pdf GLADER, L. ve S.C. LARSEN (2006), “Article 82:Excessive Pricing”
• Competition Law Insight, Vol. 5, Issue 7, s. 3-5. GREEN, N. (2003), “Problems in the Identification of Excessive Prices: The United Kingdom Experience in the Light of NAPP”, C. D. Ehlermann ve I.
• Atanasiu (der.), What is an abuse of a dominant position? içinde, Oxford, s. 79-90. GROUT, P.A. ve A. ZALEWSKA (2006), “Profitability Measures and Competition Law”, Centre for Market and Public Organisation Working Paper, No. 06/144. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893522
• GUAL, J., M. HELLWIG, A. PERROT, M. POLO, P. REY, K. SCHMIDT, R. STENBACKA (2005), “An Economic Approach to Article 82”, EAGCP Report. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf
• HORDIJK, E.P. (2001), “Excessive Pricing Under EC Competition Law; An
• Update In The Light Of ‘Dutch Developments’”, B.E. Hawk (der.), International Antitrust Law & Policy içinde, Fordham University School of Law, s. 463 - 495. JONES, A. ve B. SUFRIN (2008), EC Competition Law, Third Edition, Oxford
• University Press, New York. KON, S. ve S. TURNBULL (2003), “Pricing and the Dominant
• Firm:Implications of the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal’s Judgement in the Napp Case”, European Competition Law Review, Issue 2, s. 86. KOVACIC, W.E. (2008), “Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or Divergence?”, Bates White Fifth Annual
• Antitrust Conference, Washington. http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/080602bateswhite.pdf
• KROES, N. (2005), “Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82”
• Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 23.11.2005, New York. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537&for mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
• KROES, N. (2007), “Antitrust in the EU and the US-Our Common Objectives” başlıklı konuşma metni, 26.11.2007, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kroes/antitrust_eu_us.pdf
• LAMALLE, M., L. LINDSTRÖM-ROSSI ve A.C. TEIXEIRA (2004), “Two
• Important Rejection Decisions on Excessive Pricing in the Port Sector”, Competition Policy Newsletter, No.3, s. 40-43. LOWE, P. (2003), “How Different is EU Anti-trust? A Route Map for
• Advisors” başlıklı konuşma metni, 16.10.2003, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_038_en.pdf
• LYONS, B. (2007), “The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse”
• Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), The Pros and Cons of High Prices içinde, Stockholm, s. 65-87. MONTI, M. (2003), “Speech at 8th EU Competition Law and Policy
• Workshop”, C. D. Ehlermann ve I. Atanasiu (der.), What is an abuse of a dominant position? içinde, Hart Publishing, 2006, s. 3-9.
• MOTTA, M. ve A. STREEL (2007), “Excessive Pricing in Competition Law
• Never Say Never?”, Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), The Pros and Cons of High Prices içinde, Stockholm, s. 14-46. NERA - NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATE (2001)
• Regulatory Approaches to Cost Allocation, London. O’DONOGHUE, R. ve A.J. PADILLA (2006), The Law and Economics of
• Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, Oxford. ÖZDEMİR, Ü.N. (2009), Fiyatlamaya İlişkin Tek Taraflı Davranışların
• Değerlendirilmesinde Kullanılan Maliyet Ölçütleri, Yayımlanmamış Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu. PARDOLESI, R. ve L. ARNAUDO (2010), “Single-Firm Conduct: A Discipline in Search of Itself (Try with Google?)”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1541928
• PAULIS, E. (2007), “Article 82 EC and Exploitative Conduct”, 12. Annual
• Competiiton Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Florence. PERROT, A. (2005), “Towards an Effects-based Approach of Price Discrimination”, Konkurrensverket, s. 161-185 and Cons of Price Discrimination içinde
• ROBERTS, S. (2008), “Assessing Excessive Pricing-the Case of Flat Steel in
• South Africa”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, s. 871-891. RÖLLER, L.H. (2007), “Exploitative Abuses”, ESMT Business Brief, No. BB- 002.
• SANLI, K.C. (2000a), Rekabetin Korunması Hakkındaki Kanun’da Öngörülen
• Yasaklayıcı Hükümler ve Bu Hükümlere Aykırı Sözleşme ve Teşebbüs Birliği Kararlarının Geçersizliği, Rekabet Kurumu Lisans Üstü Tez Serisi, No:3, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara. SANLI, K.C. (2000b), “Rekabet Hukukunda Tekelci Fiyatlandırma”, Perşembe
• Konferansı, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara. SCHWEITZER, H. (2007), “Parallels and Differences in the Attitudes towards
• Single-Firm Conduct: What are the Reasons? The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec.2 Sherman Act and Art.82 EC”, EUI Working Papers Law, No. 32. ÜNAL, Ç. (2009), Aşırı Fiyat Kavramı ve Aşırı Fiyatlama Davranışının
• Rekabet Hukukundaki Yeri, Yayımlanmamış Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu ÜNSAL, E.M. (1998), Mikro İktisat, İkinci Baskı, Kutsan Ofset Matbaacılık, Ankara.
• VAN DER WOUDE, M. (2007), “Unfair and Excessive Prices in the Energy
• Sector”, 12. Annual Competiton Law and Policy Workshop, Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Florence. WALKER, M. (2010), Excessive Pricing Disharmony, European Competition
• Law Review, Vol. 31, Issue 4, s. 143-145. WILLIAMS, M. (2007), “Excessive Pricing”, Swedish Competition Authority
• (Konkurrensverket), The Pros and Cons of High Prices içinde, Stockholm, s. 153. WHISH, R. (2005), Competition Law, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, New York.
• ABD Yüksek Mahkeme Kararı Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004). Komisyon Kararları
• General Motors OJ [1975] L29/14, [1975] 1 CMLR D20 Chiquita OJ [1976] L95/1 GEMA II, OJ 1982 L 94/12
• British Telecommunications (IV/29/877) 82/861/EEC [1982] OJ L360/36
• British Leyland 84/379 [1984] OJ L207/11 Tetra Pak II, OJ 1992 L 72/1.
• Brussels National Airport 95/364 28.6.1995, OJ L 216 12.11.1995
• Irısh Sugar, [1997] OJ L258/1, [1997] 5 CMLR 666
• Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato, OJ 1998 L 252/47
• Alpha Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris 98/153 11.6.1998, OJ L 230 18.8.1998
• P&I Clubs, IGA and P&I Clubs, Pooling Agreement (IV/D-1/30.373 ve IV/D- /37.143) 1999/329/EC [1999] OJ L 125/12
• Portuguese Airports 1999/199 10.2.1999, OJ L69 16.3.1999
• Football World Cup, Case No IV/36/388) (2001/12/EC) [2000] OJ L5/55
• DSD (Der Gruene Punkt-Duales System Deutschland AG), OJ 2001 L 166/1.
• Deutsche Post-Interception of cross-border mail [2002] OJ L331/40, [2002] 4 CMLR 598
• BdKEP-Restrictions on Mail Preparation (Case COMP/38.745 [2004]
• Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg Case COMP/A.36.568/D3, [2006] CMLR 23
• Sundbusserne Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg COMP/A.36.568/D3 [2006] 4 CMLR 22
• Genel Mahkeme Kararları Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak v Commission [1994] ECR II-755
• T-5/97 Industrie des Poudres Spheriques v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3755, 4 CMLR 28
• Case T-139/98 Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato v Commission, [2001] ECR II-3413 ABAD Kararları
• Case 24/67 Parke, Davis & Co v Probel [1968] ECR 55, [1968] CMLR 47
• Case 40/70 Sirena v. Eda [1971] ECR 69, [1971] CMLR 260
• Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro-SB-Grossmarkte [1971] ECR 487, CMLR 631
• Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215
• Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM and NV Fonior ECR 313. Case 26/75 General Motors v. Commission [1975] ECR 1367, [1976] 1 CMLR
• Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207
• Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461
• Case 298/83 CICCE [1985], ECR 1105, 1986-1 CMLR 486
• Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v. Commission [1986] ECR 3263
• Case 30/87 Corinne Bodson v. Pompes funebres des regions liberees CA [1988] ECR 2479, [1989] 4 CMLR 984
• Case 247/86 Alsatel v SA Novasam [1988] ECR 5987
• Case 395/87 Ministere Public v. Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECR 2521
• Joined Cases 110, 241 & 242/88 François Lucazeau and Others v. SACEM and others [1989] ECR 2811, [1991] 4 CMLR 248
• Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA [1991] ECR I-5889
• Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Esler v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I
• Case C-18/93Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. Corporazione dei Piloti del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783
• Diğer Ülke Kararları İngiltere Attheraces Ltd and The British Horseracing Board, [2007] EWCA Civ 38 Case no: A3/2006/0126 (CCAT)
• Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited CA 98/2/2001, [2001] UK CLR 585 (OFT) Hollanda
• Case 273 Vereniging Vrije Vogel v. KLM (8.11.2000)
• Case 906 Swart v. KLM (8.11.2000)
• Case 11 Shiva v. KLM (8.10.2001) Güney Afrika
• Harmony v. Mittal [2004] 13/CR/FEB04
• Competition Appeal Court of South Africa, Case 70/CAC/Apr07 Rekabet Kurulu Kararları 3.1999 tarihli ve 99-12/89-31 sayılı HAVAŞ-1 kararı 10.1999 tarihli ve 99-46/500-316 sayılı Cine 5 kararı (Danıştay’ın iptal kararı üzerine 1.11.2007 tarih ve 07-83/1009-393 sayı ile yeniden alınmıştır.) 11.2000 tarihli ve 00-46/488-266 sayılı MS Corp. kararı 7.2001 tarihli ve 01-31/313-91 sayılı İstanbul Otobüs İşletmeleri kararı
• Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings. http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:P DF