PİŞMANLIK PROGRAMLARI

Yıl 2009, Sayı: 37, 139 - 163, 01.03.2009

Hilal Yılmaz

Öz

Kartellerle mücadele, rekabet otoritelerinin en önemli görevlerindenbiridir. Rekabet otoritelerinin kartelleri yıkma çabalarına rağmen, halakarteller kurulmaya ve işlemeye devam etmektedir. Zira, kartellerin gizliyapısı, tespit edilmesi, ispatlanması ve kovuşturması için yeterince delilbulmaya daha fazla yetki gerektirmesi nedeniyle kartellerle mücadele çokzorlu bir görevdir. Bu nedenle pişmanlık programları, kartelleri yıkmaktagittikçe daha önemli hale gelmektedir.Bu makalenin amacı, dünyada pekçok hukuk düzeninde kullanılanpişmanlık programlarını araştırmak ve pişmanlık programları nedengereklidir, nasıl çalışır, önkoşulları nelerdir gibi konuları açıklamaktır.Makale şu bölümlerden oluşmaktadır: 1. bölüm karteller ve kartelpolitikasına ilişkin bir giriş sağlayacaktır. İkinci bölümde pişmanlıkprogramı uygulamanın sebepleri tartışılacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde isepişmanlık programının çalışma mekanizması ele alınacaktır. Dördüncübölümde başarılı bir pişmanlık programının ön koşulları ortaya konacakve beşinci bölümde makale sonuçlandırılacaktır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kartel, hard-core kartel, pişmanlık programı, af, aldatma

LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

Öz

The fight against cartels is one of the most important tasks of competitionagencies. Although competition agencies CAs continue to increase theirefforts to break down cartels, they have still continued to form andoperate. Because the fight against cartels is a challenging task due totheir secret nature, more powers are required to gather enough evidenceto detect, prove and prosecute infringement. That is why leniencyprograms, which have a complex nature, are clearly becomingincreasingly important to breaking down cartels.The purpose of this article is survey the basis for leniency programswhich have been used in several jurisdictions around the world andexplain why the leniency programs are necessary, how they work, whattheir prerequisites are.The article is structured in the following way: Section 1 provides an

Anahtar Kelimeler

Cartel, hard-core cartel, leniency programmes, amnesty, cheating

Kaynakça

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