إستراتيجية تركيا الكبرى والقوى العظمى

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 1, 41 - 72, 01.01.2022

Şener Aktürk

Öz

إلى أيّ مدى تتوافق الإستراتيجية الكبرى لتركيا مع إستراتيجيات القوى العظمى العالمية؟ تلخّص هذه الدراسة مبادئ الإستراتيجية الكبرى لتركيا بإيجاز من وجهة نظر وصفية ومعيارية، ثم تنتقل بعد ذلك لتحدد وتقارن بين الإستراتيجيات الكبرى للقوى العظمى الخمس ذات العضوية الدائمة في مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة. ففي حين ثمة بعض الصراعات الواضحة للعيان بين تركيا والوكلاء الفرنسيين والروس والأمريكان في سوريا وليبيا والقوقاز، فإنّه بالمقابل لا توجد صراعات عسكرية بين تركيا والوكلاء البريطانيين. كما تتخذ الصين أيضًا موقفًا مضادًّا لتركيا في العديد من النزاعات الدولية، من ذلك الحرب في سوريا، ويضيف الاضطهاد البالغ للمسلمين الأويغور الترك في شينغيانغ بعدًا آخر للنزاعات الصينية-التركية الكامنة. ويخلص البحث إلى أن الإستراتيجية التركية الكبرى تبدو أكثر توافقًا أو أقل تعارضًا مع الإستراتيجية البريطانية الكبرى، تتلوها الإستراتيجية الكبرى للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من بين الدول الخمس الأعضاء في مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة، بينما تبدو الإستراتيجيات التركية والفرنسية والروسية على وجه التحديد في حالة تعارض.

Anahtar Kelimeler

الإستراتيجية الكبرى, الصين, فرنسا, روسيا, تركيا, المملكة المتحدة, الولابات المتحدة

Turkey’s Grand Strategy and the Great Powers

Öz

This article briefly summarizes principles of Turkish grand strategy, both from a descriptive and normative point of view, and then proceeds to outline and compare the grand strategies of five great powers that are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While there are some observable conflicts between Turkey and the French, Russian, and American proxies in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, there are no outstanding militarized conflicts between Turkey and the British proxies. China is also positioned against Turkey in several international conflicts including Syria, and the intense persecution of Turkic Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang adds another dimension of latent Chinese-Turkish conflicts. The article provisionally concludes that the Turkish grand strategy seems to be most compatible, or least incompatible, with the British grand strategy, followed by the U.S. grand strategy. whereas Turkish and French and especially Russian grand strategies seem
particularly incompatible.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Grand Strategy, China, France, Russia, Turkey, UK, U.S.

Kaynakça

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