RUS ÖZEL ASKERİ ŞİRKETLERİ VE SURİYE İÇ SAVAŞI, 2013-2019

Öz

2003 yılındaki ABD’nin Irak’ı işgali uluslararası ilişkilerde yeni bir terimin herkesçe bilinir hale gelmesini sağlamıştır. Bu terim Özel Askeri Şirketlerdir. Özel Güvenlik Şirketlerinden farklı olarak, özellikle büyük devletlerin uluslararası hukukun kurallarını ve yaptırımlarını delmek ve dış politika amaçlarını kamuoyuna hesap verme zorunluluğunu asgariye indirerek gerçekleştirmede etkili bir araç olabileceği düşünülen özel askeri şirketler, Irak işgalinde adı sıklıkla duyulan Blackwater Şirketi’nden sonra oldukça popüler hale gelmiştir. 1990’lı yıllarda Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması Rusya Federasyonu ile bir geçiş ve bocalama dönemi geçirmiştir. Bu dönemde Uluslararası İlişkilerde daha etkin olabilmek, kendi kamuoyunda iz bırakmış olan Afganistan İşgali sonrasındaki problemleri yeniden yaşamak istemeyen Rusya Federasyonu tarihi olarak savaş ve çatışmalarda gönüllülerin kullanılması uygulamasını da bir sistematiğe oturtabilmek adına da özel askeri şirketleri dış politika amaçlarını gerçekleştirmede kullanma yoluna gitmiştir. Bunun en bilinen örneği ve başta Wagner Group gibi Rus özel askeri şirketlerinin de tanınmasını sağlayan olay ise Suriye İç Savaşı olmuştur. Uluslararası İlişkilerde daha etkin olmak ve süpergüç statüsüne yeniden kavuşmak isteyen Rusya Federasyonu yönetimi, Batı dünyası ve NATO tarafından desteklenen Arap baharı ve eski Sovyet nüfuz bölgesinde ortaya çıkan Renkli Devrimleri kendi ulusal güvenliğine yönelen doğrudan bir tehdit olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu yüzden eski müttefiklerini korumanın bir gereklilik olduğuna kanat getirmiştir. Bu kapsamda eski müttefiklerinden birisi olan Suriye yönetiminin Arap Baharı’nın ülkeye yansıması olan iç savaşta devrilmesini önlemek için 2015 yılında resmen, Suriye yönetimini daveti ile dâhil olmuştur. Ancak Rusya’nın Suriye’deki askeri mevcudiyeti bu tarihten daha önce, Wagner Group’un da selefi olan Slavonic Corps vasıtasıyla 2013 yılında başlamıştır. Bu çalışmada Slavonic Corps’la başlayan ve daha sonra da Wagner Group’la devam eden Suriye İç Savaşı’na Rusya’nın dahli konusu, 2013-2019 yıllarındaki zaman aralığında olmak üzere incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Özel Askeri Şirketler
• Slavonic Corps
• Wagner Group
• Suriye İç Savaşı

THE RUSSIAN PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES and SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, 2013-2019

Öz

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 made a new term in international relations known to everyone. This term is Private Military Companies (PMC). Unlike Private Security Companies, PMCs, which are thought to be an effective tool especially for super powers to avoid the rules and sanctions of international law and achieve their foreign policy objectives by minimizing the obligation to be accountable to the public. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s led to a period of transition in the Russian Federation. In this period, the Russian Federation, which does not want to be more effective in International Relations and does not want to experience the problems after the Afghanistan Invasion of 1979. The most well-known example of this, and the event that made Russian private military companies wellknown, was the Syrian Civil War.The administration of the Russian Federation, which wants to be more effective in International Relations and regain its superpower status, has defined the Arab Spring, and the Color Revolutions that emerged in the former Soviet sphere of influence, as a direct threat to its national security. That's why Russia believed it was necessary to protect his former allies. In this context, Russia officially supported the Syrian government in 2015, upon its invitation, in order to prevent the Syrian government, one of its former allies, from being overthrown in the civil war that was a reflection of the Arab Spring on the country. However, Russia's military presence in Syria began before this date, in 2013, through the Slavonic Corps, the predecessor of the Wagner Group. In this study, the issue of Russia's involvement in the Syrian Civil War, which started with the Slavonic Corps and then continued with the Wagner Group, will be examined in the period between 2013 and 2019.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Private Military Companies
• Slavonic Corps
• Wagner Group
• Syrian Civil War

Kaynakça

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