Hereditary Oil Monarchies: Why Arab Spring Fails in GCC Arabian States?

Abstract

This study tries to reveal the reasons of why Arab Spring could not change the hereditary oil monarchies regimes in Persian Gulf, when compare with other countries in region. The strong cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman, hereditary monarchies for long years, high oil and natural gas income and sharing with lower social class that did not cause to improve strong demand among public to change regime of countries, also the external powers such as America and European Union restrained to spread Arabic Spring out in these countries due to their energy benefits.

Keywords

• Gulf Cooperation Council, Arabic Spring, Monarchy Regimes

Kalıtsal Petrol Monarşileri: Neden Arap Baharı GCC Arap Devletlerinde Başarısız Oldu?

Öz

Bu çalışmadamonarşik rejimle yönetilen Körfez İşbirliği Teşkilatı üyesi ülkelerinde Arap Baharı’nın neden diğer bölge ülkelerinde olduğu gibi etkili olmadığınınsebepleri ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Körfez İşbirliği Teşkilatı ülkeleri; Suudi Arabistan, Kuveyt, Bahreyn, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Katar ve Umman’ın çok sıkı bir işbirliği içinde olması,yönetici elitlerin uzun yıllardan beri ülke yönetiminde söz sahibi olmaları, bu ülkelerin petrol ve doğalgaz gelirlerinin yüksek olması ve dolayısıylabu gelirleri tabana yayma imkanlarının oluşması ülke halklarının devlete karşı güçlü bir rejim değişikliği talebinin oluşmamasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Ayrıca Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika’nın bu ülkelerindekienerji politikalarının sekteye uğramaması için Arap Baharı’nın bu ülkelerde yayılmamasına katkıda bulunmuşlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Körfez İşbirliği Ülkeleri, Arap Baharı, Monarşi Rejimleri

Kaynakça

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