Mehmed Tevfik Efendi and His Treatise on Whether Quiddity is Subject to Creation: A Critical Edition of Risālah fī Maj‘ūliyya al-Māhiyya
Öz
Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi, widely known as Çerkeşşeyhīzāde, is one of the most renowned scholars to have lived during the era of Sultan Abdulhamīd II. His works are dedicated to a wide range of Islamic sciences which include theology, Islamic law, logic, and philology. Although some of these works are characterized as didactic texts, others evince his henceforth unexplored philosophical interests. One such treatise deals with the philosophical problem known as ja‘l. The treatise essentially tries to address the ontological status of quiddity in keeping with the Akbarian philosophical tradition. Based on a real distinction between Muslim thinkers, there is a group that sees quiddity insofar as its quiddity is created by an agent, i.e. God. While others defend quiddity itself as being uncreated by an agent rather than it being eternal.
Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi was a Sunni scholar who, at the same time, was a defender of the ‘oneness of existence’ (wahdat al-wujūd), as is clear from his work on Ibn ‘Arabī. For him, quiddity itself can not be a subject to any meaning of effect. In this regard, we see him relating this to another problem known as al-a‘yān al-thābita which originates with the Akbarian tradition. He, however, does not limit himself to these two concepts but also incorporates one from the Ishrāqī tradition known as hayākil. For Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi, the problem of ontological positions of these concepts, that is, whether they are a subject to an effect or not, refer in fact to the same issue.
The treatise consists of two main parts. In the first part, Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi tries to establish his view on the issue at hand by clarifying the problem of maj‘ūliyyat as a real philosophical problem rather than approaching it as a simple philological issue. Therefore, for him, any attempt – including al-Rāzī’s position – to bridge both sides of the problem closer together is meaningless. On that account, the first thing to do is to clarify the essence of the debate. Referring to al-Dawānī, Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi presents the problem as follows: Is the quiddity subject to creation (ja‘l), as Imām al-Ash‘arī sees it; or is it not subject to creation and instead comes after the qualification of it by existence, as the jumhūr upholds? After putting the problem in a real and correct context, he ascertains that quiddity is not subject to creation. This is because the essences of things, even if they are not subsistent in the external world, are separated and multiplied in God’s knowledge. This means that the possible extistents are temporal in terms of their external existence, but are eternal in terms of their existence in God’s knowledge.
In the second part, Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi addresses hypothetical questions. Some of these questions relate to the problem of predestination and fate, while others relate to more technical issues such as ‘the meaning of the thing in itself’ (nafs al-amr). As for the first one, the author stresses that there is no escape from predestination in any complete sense. Moreover, this is not something that is required. What should be eliminated is despotism as this leads to injustices over God’s creatures. He then treats the problem of nafs al-amr and asserts that it is nothing but God’s knowledge. He refutes the opposing claim which maintains that nafs al-amr refers to the first intellect. The reason for this is that for Mehmed Tevfīk Efendi every form in it is only a reflection of realities separated from forms. So realities of things are imprinted in God’s knowledge before the first intellect. He then concludes that without considering the ontological positions of realities in God’s knowledge they are absolute non-beings.
The author, in addition to technical and philosophical issues, addresses more practical, secondary issues as well. For example, he discusses the meaning of prayer and its effectiveness. Based on the idea that whatever happens is formerly known in divine knowledge and that this knowledge is dependent on the quiddity of the thing itself, he questions the benefit of precautionary acts as well as that of prayer. The answer is clear for the author. According to him, most of the things are suspended fate (al-qadā’ al-mu‘allaq) and depend on the acts of human beings. If precaution or prayer is synchronized with fate (taqdīr) it benefits one, otherwise it does not.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Çerkeşşeyhîzâde Mehmed Tevfîk Efendi’nin Mâhiyetin Mec‘ûliyeti Meselesine Dair Risalesi: İnceleme ve Tahkik
Öz
II. Abdülhamid döneminin önde gelen âlimlerinden Çerkeşşeyhîzâde Mehmed Tevfîk Efendi (ö. 1901), üstlendiği önemli görevlerin yanı sıra farklı ilim dallarında telif ettiği eserler ile de etkili bir isim olmuştur. Çoğu, müellifi hayattayken basılan eserlerinden bir kısmı öğretici vasfı öne çıkan ve âlet ilimlerine hasredilen çalışmalarken az bilinen diğer bir kısmı ise felsefî bir dille yazılmıştır. Bunların en önemlisi, onun, mâhiyetlerin mec‘ûliyeti, yani yaratmaya konu olup olmaması meselesine tahsis ettiği risalesidir. Çerkeşşeyhîzâde’nin kelamcı, sûfî, fakih gibi bilinen yönlerine ilave olarak filozof yönünü öne çıkaran bu çalışması, onun Ekberî (İbn Arabî takipçileri) düşünce geleneğinden beslenerek mutlak mâhiyetin ontik statüsüne yönelik soruşturmasını içermektedir. O, bu çalışmada oldukça cesur bir biçimde mâhiyetlerin ezelîliğini savunmakta ve mâhiyetleri Tanrı’nın bilgisi ile irtibatlandırarak kulun mesûliyeti, kader, cebir, nefsü’l-emir gibi felsefî problemlere çözüm aramaktadır. Bu makale, Çerkeşşeyhîzâde’nin söz konusu risalesinin içerik açısından tahlilini ve neşrini ihtiva etmekte olup, onun az bilinen felsefî birikimini bir yönüyle ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
