Rant Arayışı Davranışının Ekonomi Politiği ve Kazanılmamış Gelir ve Eşitsizlikle Bağlantısı

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 2, 593 - 608, 25.07.2024

H. Hilal Bağlıtaş

https://doi.org/10.30626/tesamakademi.1373195

Öz

Eşitsizlik onlarca yıldır ele alınması gereken en önemli sorunlardan biri olagelmiş ve gelir (veya servet) eşitsizliğine ilişkin çalışmalar pek çok araştırmanın kaynağını oluşturmuştur. Gelir dağılımındaki eşitsizliğin kaynaklarına bakıldığında, bir faktör verimsiz ve ancak yalnızca servet birikimi için makulse, geliri saptırıcı bir etkiye sahip olmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda rant arama faaliyetleri, saptırıcı içeriğe uygun bir yapıdadır. Rant arayışında mal ve hizmet miktarına katkı sunulmaksızın kazanç amaçlanmakta ve bu yönüyle hak edilmemiş (kazanılmamış) gelir özelliği göstermektedir. Kazanılan gelir, fiziksel ve zihinsel faaliyetlerden elde edilen emek karşılığında ödenir. Ancak kazanılmamış gelir bu özelliğe sahip değildir ve gelire yatırım yapılması nedeniyle elde edilen gelirin getirisidir. Başka bir açıdan Stiglitz'in (2016) ifadesine göre rant arayışı, servetten daha fazla pay alma mücadelesidir. Daha büyük pay almak, payların azalmasıyla bağlantılıdır ve toplum içinde eşitsizliğe yol açar. Bu yazıda, rant kollama davranışının ekonomi politiği bağlamında çeşitli yaklaşımlar incelenecektir. Ayrıca rant arayışının kazanılmamış gelir ve eşitsizlikle nasıl ilişkili olduğu gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rant Arama, Kazanılmamış Gelir, Eşitsizlik, Politik Ekonomi

The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Behavior and the Connection with Unearned Income and Inequality

Öz

For decades, inequality has been one of the most important problems to be tackled, and studies of income (or wealth) inequality are the source of much research. When we deal with the sources of unequal income distribution, and if a factor is unproductive but only reasonable in the accumulation of wealth, it has a diverting impact on income. In this line, rent-seeking activities are a structure suitable for this content. Rent-seeking is aimed at gaining without contributing to the number of goods and services and shows the characteristic of unearned income. Earned income is paid for the labor from physical and mental activities. Unearned income does not have this feature and is a return on income due to investment in income. According to Stiglitz (2016), rent-seeking is a struggle to get a larger share of wealth. Taking larger shares is linked to declining shares and leads to inequality within society. In the context of the political economy of rent-seeking behavior, we examine various approaches. In addition, we illustrate how rent-seeking is related to unearned income and inequality.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rent-Seeking, Unearned Income, Inequality, Political Economy

Kaynakça

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