Evaluation of Capabilities of Russian Federation’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/ Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle

Abstract

This study aims to reveal Russian Federation's (RF) capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)/armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UCAV) systems, efforts to develop UAV/UCAV systems, and how it uses existing UAV/UCAV capabilities in military operations. The main claim of the study is that RF is not advanced in long-range and medium/high altitude UAV/UCAV systems, but it follows various policies in order to eliminate the aforementioned capability deficiencies in a short time. Considering the RF military power parameters, it is generally among the leading countries of the world in every field. However, the capabilities of RF's UAV and UCAV systems are the exception to this situation. RF remained relatively uninterested in UAV/UCAV systems for various reasons in the 1990s and 2000s. For this reason, it cannot sufficiently benefit from the force multiplier effect created by the UAV/UCAV systems in the battlefield. RF, which is at a certain level in tactical UAV systems, needs long range, medium and high altitude UAV/UCAV systems. In this context, the projects started in the 2010s have gained momentum in recent years. Today, the RF is trying to meet its urgent needs for UAVs / UCAVs with its own means, and if it is not possible, tries to procure it from countries such as Iran. If RF can realize the planned UAV/UCAV projects, it will become an important UAV/UCAV manufacturer and user in the near future. The most challenging issue for Moscow in this regard is the sanctions imposed on RF by the USA and Western countries due to Ukraine.

Keywords

• Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
• Russian Federation
• unmanned aerial vehicle

Rusya Federasyonu’nun İnsansız Hava Aracı/Silahlı İnsansız Hava Aracı Kabiliyetlerinin Değerlendirilmesi

Öz

Bu çalışma Rusya Federasyonu’nun (RF); insansız hava aracı (İHA)/silahlı insansız hava aracı (SİHA) sistemleri imkân ve kabiliyetlerini, İHA/SİHA sistemleri geliştirme sürecini ve mevcut İHA/SİHA kabiliyetlerini askeri harekâtlarında nasıl kullandığını ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın temel iddiası RF’nin uzun menzilli ve orta/yüksek irtifa İHA/SİHA sistemlerinde ileri seviyede bulunmadığı, ancak bahse konu yetenek eksikliklerini kısa sürede gidermek maksadıyla çeşitli politikalar izlediğidir. RF askeri güç parametreleri göz önüne alındığında genel olarak her alanda dünyanın önde gelen ülkeleri arasında bulunmaktadır. Ancak RF’nin İHA ve SİHA sistemleri imkân ve kabiliyetleri bu durumun istisnasını oluşturmaktadır. RF, 1990’lı ve 2000’li yıllarda İHA/SİHA sistemlerine çeşitli nedenlerle görece ilgisiz kalmıştır. Bu nedenle günümüzde İHA/SİHA sistemlerinin muharebe sahasında yarattığı kuvvet çarpanı etkisinden yeterince yararlanamamaktadır. Taktik İHA sistemlerinde belirli bir seviyede bulunan RF, uzun menzilli, orta ve yüksek irtifa İHA/SİHA sistemlerine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Bu kapsamda 2010’lu yıllarda başlatılan projeler, son yıllarda hız kazanmıştır. RF günümüzde İHA/SİHA’lara yönelik acil ihtiyaçlarını kendi imkânlarıyla karşılamaya çalışmakta, mümkün olmadığı takdirde ise İran gibi ülkelerden tedarik etmeye çalışmaktadır. RF, planlanan İHA/SİHA projelerini gerçekleştirebilmesi durumunda yakın dönemde önemli bir İHA/SİHA üreticisi ve kullanıcısı durumuna gelecektir. Bu konuda Moskova’yı en fazla zorlayan husus ise Ukrayna nedeniyle ABD ve Batılı ülkelerin RF’ye uyguladıkları yaptırımlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rusya Federasyonu
• silahlı insansız hava aracı
• insansız hava aracı

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