Mearsheimer’s Tragedy: Offensive Realism and Realist American Exceptionalism

Öz

Why does Mearsheimer explain post-Cold War US foreign policy through unit-level variables rather than presenting a structural explanation? Mearsheimer is the leading offensive realist who offers a structural explanation for great power revisionism. However, while offensive realism’s bedrock assumptions compel great powers to act as revisionist actors and maximize power, Mearsheimer portrays the United States as a status quo power and explains post-Cold War US foreign policy via unit-level variables. In another words, rather than describing a revisionist great power, he prescribes that the US should act as a status quo power. Thereby, Mearsheimer transforms offensive realism from a structural and descriptive theory into a reductionist and prescriptive one. This article conceptualizes Mearsheimer’s inclination as a realist American exceptionalism and concludes that offensive realism should be refined to present a structural explanation for great power revisionism.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• offensive realism
• revisionism
• realist American exceptionalism

Etik Beyan

Google Gemini was utilized for grammar checking and improving sentence clarity. All scientific content, analyses, and conclusions were independently developed by the author. The author assumes full responsibility for any ethical or academic implications arising from the use of generative AI tools.

Mearsheimer’ın Trajedisi: Saldırgan Realizm ve Realist Amerikan İstisnacılığı

Öz

Mearsheimer, Soğuk Savaş sonrası ABD dış politikasını yapısal bir açıklama sunmak yerine neden birim düzeyindeki değişkenler üzerinden açıklamaktadır? Mearsheimer, büyük güç revizyonizmine yapısal bir açıklama getiren önde gelen saldırgan realisttir. Ancak, saldırgan realizmin temel varsayımları büyük güçleri revizyonist aktörler olarak hareket etmeye ve güçlerini azamiye çıkarmaya zorlarken; Mearsheimer, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni statükocu bir güç olarak resmetmekte ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası ABD dış politikasını birim düzeyindeki değişkenlerle açıklamaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Mearsheimer, revizyonist bir büyük gücü betimlemek yerine, ABD'nin statükocu bir güç gibi hareket etmesi gerektiğini reçete etmektedir. Böylece Mearsheimer, saldırgan realizmi yapısal ve betimleyici bir teori olmaktan çıkarıp indirgemeci ve reçete sunan bir teoriye dönüştürmektedir. Bu makale, Mearsheimer’ın bu yönelimini realist bir Amerikan istisnacılığı olarak kavramsallaştırmakta ve saldırgan realizmin, büyük güç revizyonizmine yapısal bir açıklama sunabilmesi için yeniden düşünülmesi gerektiği sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• saldırgan realizm
• revizyonizm
• realist Amerikan istisnacılığı

Etik Beyan

Google Gemini, dilbilgisi kontrolü ve cümlelerin açıklığını artırmak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Tüm bilimsel içerik, analizler ve sonuçlar yazar tarafından bağımsız olarak geliştirilmiştir. Üretken yapay zeka araçlarının kullanımından doğabilecek her türlü etik veya akademik sorumluluk tamamen yazara aittir.

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