İŞLEM MALİYETİ ve AĞ YAKLAŞIMLARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN KUYUMCULUK SEKTÖRÜ: KAYIT DIŞILIK ve EKONOMİK AVANTAJ

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 21, 57 - 69, 29.06.2022

Beste Altınçubuk

Öz

Kuyumculuk sektörü diğer sektörlerden farklı özelliklere sahiptir. Sektörde belge olmamasına rağmen sektördeki aktörler ortak bir anlaşmaya varabilmektedirler. Kuyumculuk sektöründe kapalı bir sistem bulunmaktadır ve bu mekanizma sisteme yön vermektedir. Bu araştırma kuyumculuk sektöründeki ilişkilerin belirleyicilerini incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu belirleyiciler ortaya konulmaya çalışılırken, ağ ve işlem maliyeti yaklaşımının sektördeki ilişkilerin ayakta kalmasını etkileme ölçüsü araştırılmaktadır. Çalışmada kuyumculuk sektöründe alıcı ve tedarikçi arasındaki güven ağının sektörün kayıt dışılığını etkileyip etkilemediği ve kuyumculuk sektöründeki kayıt dışılığın alıcılar ve tedarikçiler arasında ekonomik avantajı kolaylaştıran bir mekanizma olup olmadığı incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Güven, Ağ, Mücevher, Kayıt Dışılık, Ekonomik Avantaj

JEWELRY SECTOR WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVES OF TRANSACTION COST and NETWORK APPROACHES: INFORMALITY and ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

Öz

Jewelry sector has different characteristics from other sectors. Although there is no documentation in the sector, the actors in the sector can reach to a common agreement. There is a closed system in jewelry sector and this mechanism directs the system. This research attempts to investigate the determinants of the relations in jewelry sector. While trying to show these determinants, this study investigates to what extent network and transaction cost approach explain the survival of the relations in the sector. It is explored in the study whether trust network between buyer and supplier in jewelry sector affects the informality of the sector and the informality in the jewelry sector is a mechanism that facilitates the economic advantage between buyers and suppliers.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Trust, Network, Jewelry, Informality, Economic Advantage

Kaynakça

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