The Securitization of Semiconductors: U.S. and Chinese Strategies in the Race for Global Technology Leadership

Yıl 2026, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 1, 17 - 40, 10.01.2026

Uğur Yildiz

https://doi.org/10.62334/ulipod.1695427

Öz

Technology constitutes the most intense arena of competition in the global power struggle between the United States and China. Although technological rivalry encompasses a wide array of subdomains, semiconductors have emerged as a critical focal point due to their dual role as a representation of cutting-edge innovation and as indispensable components in other technological systems. The semiconductor industry involves extremely complex production stages and a supply chain that spans across continents before culminating in the final product. Both the United States and China are formulating policies aimed at achieving full control over all stages of the semiconductor supply chain by framing these processes as matters of national security. The impact of such policies transcends bilateral relations, directly shaping global alliances and the international semiconductor supply chain. This paper analyzes the semiconductor competition between the two states through the lens of securitization theory and presents an evaluation of its global ramifications.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Semiconductors , US-China rivalry , Securitization

Küresel Teknoloji Liderliği Rekabetinde Yarı İletkenler: ABD ve Çin'in Güvenlikleştirme Stratejileri

Öz

ABD ile Çin arasındaki küresel güç mücadelesindeki en yoğun rekabetin yaşandığı alan teknolojidir. Teknoloji rekabeti çok sayıda alt konu başlığını içermekle birlikte bu başlıklar içerisinde yer alan yarı iletkenler, hem en ileri teknolojiyi temsil etmesi hem de diğer teknolojilerdeki kritik bileşen olması sebebiyle, rekabette kritik odak noktası haline gelmiştir. Yarı iletkenler, son derece karmaşık üretim aşamalarını içeren ve nihai ürün haline gelene kadar kıtalararası üretim süreçlerini kapsayan bir tedarik zincirine sahiptir. ABD ve Çin yarı iletken tedarik zincirinin tüm süreçlerini ulusal güvenlik konusu haline getirerek bu süreçlerde tam kontrolü elde etmeye yönelik politikalar geliştirmektedir. Bu politikaların etkileri ikili ilişiklerin ötesine geçerek küresel ittifakları ve sektörün küresel tedarik zincirini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bu makale iki devletin yarı iletken sektörü üzerindeki rekabetini Güvenlikleştirme teorisi üzerinden ele alarak küresel etkilerine yönelik bir analiz sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Yarıiletkenler , ABD-Çin Rekabeti , Güvenlikleştirme

Kaynakça

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