Sınırlı Belirsizlik Koşullarında Ücretsiz Fazla Mesai Sırasında Kaytarma

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, davranışsal iktisat alanında süresi net olarak belirlenmemiş ücretsiz fazla mesailerde çalışanların kaytarma davranışını ele alıyoruz. Standart istihdam koşullarında kaytarma üzerine kapsamlı araştırmalar yapılmış olsa da çalışanların ücretsiz mesai süresini kısaltıp uzatabildikleri durumlarda nasıl davrandıkları hakkında çok az şey bilinmektedir. Bu çalışma, sonuçlar hakkında sınırlı belirsizlik koşulları altında ücretsiz fazla mesai sürelerini kontrol eden çalışanları incelemektedir. Avrupa futbolundan 9.018 yüksek riskli karardan oluşan kapsamlı bir veri seti kullanarak, çalışanların ücretsiz fazla mesai ile karşı karşıya kaldıklarında sistematik olarak kaytarma davranışı gösterdiklerine dair kanıt sunuyoruz. Analizimiz, sonucun belirsizliği azaldıkça çalışanların sistematik olarak olması gerekenden daha kısa ücretsiz mesai yaptıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Bulgular, sınırlı belirsizlik ve ücretsiz fazla mesainin çalışan davranışını etkilemek için nasıl etkileşime girdiğine dair yeni bulgular sağlamakta ve çalışanların fazla mesai süresini kontrol ettiği ortamlarda işyeri verimliliği için çıkarımlar sunmaktadır.

Keywords

• Belirsizlik
• Hakem davranışı
• Kaytarma
• Stratejik karar verme
• Ücretsiz fazla mesai

Shirking During Unpaid Overtime Under Limited Uncertainty

Abstract

Understanding shirking behaviour during unpaid overtime periods of uncertain duration remains a fundamental challenge in behavioural economics. While extensive research has examined shirking under standard employment conditions, little is known about how decision-makers respond when they can influence the likelihood of continued unpaid work. This study examines decision-makers who control the duration of unpaid overtime periods under conditions of limited uncertainty about outcomes. Using a comprehensive dataset of 9,018 high-stakes decisions from European football, we find systematic evidence of strategic shirking behaviour when decision-makers face indefinite unpaid overtime. Our analysis reveals that as outcome uncertainty decreases, decision-makers systematically reduce the duration of unpaid overtime periods. The findings provide novel insights into how limited uncertainty and unpaid overtime interact to drive strategic behaviour, with implications for workplace productivity and incentive design in environments where workers control overtime duration.

Keywords

• Shirking
• Uncertainty
• Unpaid overtime
• Referee behaviour
• Strategic decision-making

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