Abstract

In recent years, Arctic Region has been the one of the areas most affected by global climate change, also known as the North Pole. The melting of the glaciers in the Arctic Region with the effect of the climate change has made easier to reach inaccessible areas. Thus, access to energy resources on the Arctic Ocean floor has been facilitated and new sea routes have opened. These opportunities, which emerged with the melting of the glaciers, increased the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Arctic. In particular, the increase in the economic and commercial potential of the Arctic has caused the coastal states to strengthen their sovereignty claims on the Arctic Ocean and to increase the conflicts between them. The struggle over the opportunities in the Arctic caused to change of the security approach of the coastal states. Russia, which has the longest costline in the Arctic, increased the security measures in order to protect its national interests on both natural resources and new sea routes was perceived as a threat by other coastal states. This caused to the other coastal states come together under the umbrella of NATO against Russia. This situation resulted in NATO’s increasing effectiveness in the region as a powerful and effective actor against Russian militarization as it was in the Cold War years. In this context, the subject of the study is to examine whether NATO is effective in preserving peace and stability against Russia in the Arctic. Within this framework the study will seek to answer the following question: “Is NATO an effective actor against Russia with its presence in the Arctic region in maintaining stability and preventing conflicts?”

Keywords

• Arctic
• NATO
• Russia
• Armament
• Militarization.

ARKTİK’TE SİLAHLANMA YARIŞI: RUSYA VE NATO

Abstract

Son yıllarda küresel iklim değişikliğinden en fazla etkilenen alanlardan biri Kuzey Kutbu olarak da bilinen Arktik Bölgesi olmuştur. İklim değişikliğinin etkisiyle Arktik Bölgesi’ndeki buzulların erimesi, erişilemeyen alanlara ulaşılmasını kolaylaştırmıştır. Böylece, Arktik Okyanusu’nun tabanındaki enerji kaynaklarına erişim kolaylaşmış ve yeni deniz yolları açılmıştır. Buzulların erimesiyle ortaya çıkan bu fırsatlar, Arktik’in jeopolitik ve jeostratejik önemini arttırmıştır. Özellikle Arktik’in ekonomik ve ticari potansiyelinin artması, kıyıdaş devletlerin Arktik üzerindeki egemenlik iddialarını güçlendirmelerine ve bu devletler arasındaki anlaşmazlıkların artmasına neden olmuştur. Arktik’teki fırsatlar üzerindeki bu mücadele ortamı, kıyıdaş devletlerin güvenlik yaklaşımlarını değiştirmelerine neden olmuştur. Arktik’te en uzun kıyı şeridine sahip devlet olan Rusya’nın Arktik’teki hem enerji kaynaklarını hem de yeni deniz yolları üzerindeki ulusal çıkarlarını korumak amacıyla güvenlik önlemlerini arttırması, diğer kıyıdaş devletler tarafından bir tehdit olarak algılanmıştır. Bu da diğer kıyıdaş devletlerin Rusya’ya karşı NATO çatısı altında biraraya gelmelerine neden olmuştur. Bu durum Soğuk Savaş yıllarında olduğu gibi NATO’nun Rusya’nın silahlanması karşısında yeniden güçlü ve etkili bir aktör olarak bölgedeki etkinliğini arttırması ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın konusu, NATO’nun Arktik’te Rusya karşısında barışın ve istikrarın korunmasında etkili olup olmadığının incelenmesi olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, “NATO, Rusya’ya karşı bölgedeki varlığı ile istikrarın korunmasında ve çatışmaların önlenmesinde etkili bir aktör müdür?” sorusuna yanıt aranması amaçlanmaktadır.

Keywords

• Arktik
• NATO
• Rusya
• Silahlanma
• Askerileşme.

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