Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörlerin Sahel Bölgesinde Askerî Rekabeti ve Nüfuz Mücadelesi

Öz

Bu çalışma, 2012 yılında Mali’de başlayan güvenlik krizinin ardından Sahel ve Batı Afrika’da artan askeri ve jeopolitik rekabeti ele almaktadır. Fransa’nın uzun süreli askeri müdahaleleri yerel tepkilere ve darbeler zincirine zemin hazırlarken, Rusya Wagner grubu ve yeni kurumsal yapılar aracılığıyla bölgedeki etkisini artırma çabasına girmiştir. ABD, bazı üslerini boşaltarak askeri varlığını yeniden yapılandırırken; Türkiye savunma sanayi iş birlikleri ve SİHA ihracatıyla bölgedeki etkisini genişletmektedir. Çin ise doğrudan müdahaleden kaçınarak askeri üs, silah ihracatı ve ekonomik yatırımlarla varlık göstermektedir. Bölgedeki bu çok aktörlü rekabet, sadece güvenlik değil; aynı zamanda doğal kaynakların kontrolü, ekonomik çıkarlar ve ideolojik etkiler üzerinden de şekillenmektedir. Artan dış müdahaleler, bölge ülkelerinin egemenliklerini ve güvenlik yapılarını zayıflatmakta, Sahel’i uluslararası güç mücadelesinin merkezlerinden biri haline getirmektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Sahel
• Geopolical
• Global
• Millatary

Geopolitical Rivalry in the Sahel: Global and Regional Military Engagements

Abstract

This study examines the growing military and geopolitical competition in the Sahel and West Africa following the security crisis that began in northern Mali in 2012. France’s prolonged military presence, initially framed as counterterrorism, gradually triggered local backlash and contributed to a wave of coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Russia has expanded its influence through the Wagner Group and now seeks institutionalization via the newly formed "Africa Corps." The United States, facing strategic setbacks, has withdrawn from bases in Niger and Chad, aiming to reposition some forces in Côte d'Ivoire and among regional partners. Türkiye is emerging as a new actor through defense cooperation agreements and the export of Bayraktar drones, while China maintains a limited military footprint, relying on a base in Djibouti and increasing arms exports to safeguard its economic interests. This multi-actor competition is not only military but also economic, diplomatic, and ideological in nature. Control over natural resources such as uranium, gold, and oil, along with maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, renders the region strategically significant. Rising foreign military presence is weakening regional stability, undermining state sovereignty, and reshaping the region’s security architecture—developments that are likely to influence both future international power balances and the foreign policy preferences of African states.

Keywords

• Geopolitical
• Sahel
• Military
• Global

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