DOĞU ASYA’DA WASHINGTON SİSTEMİNİN JAPON GİRİŞİMLERİYLE TESTİ VE CAYDIRICILIĞIN BAŞARISIZLIĞI

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın amacı, iki savaş arası dönemde Doğu Asya’da ABD’nin liderliğinde Washington Sistemi’yle kurulan statükonun Japonya’nın girişimleriyle test edilmesi sürecini caydırıcılık perspektifinden değerlendirmektir. Caydırıcılık, kazanç/maliyet hesabına dayanmaktadır. Statükoya meydan okumanın maliyeti potansiyel kazanca göre daha fazla ise meydan okuma niyetinde olan devlet statükoyu tercih edecektir. Bu noktada caydırıcılığın başarıyla işlemesi ve statükonun sürdürülmesi için belirleyici olan iki temel kriter statükocu devletlerin sahip olduğu cezalandırma kapasitesinin inanılırlığı ve aktörlerin statükodan memnuniyetidir. 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren Doğu Asya bölgesel sisteminde meydana gelen güç asimetrisindeki değişim, Çin İmparatorluğu’nun düşüşü, Japonya’nın yükselişi ve bölge devletlerinin Batılı uluslararası ilişkiler sistemine girmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Ancak I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ABD’nin önderliğinde kurulan Washington Sistemi bölgede statükodan memnuniyetsiz bir Japonya ortaya çıkarmıştır. Sahip olduğu materyal yetenekler arttıkça Japonya, Washington Sistemi’ni sarsacak adımlar atmaya başlamıştır. ABD’nin iki savaş arası dönemde yeniden yalnızcılık politikası benimsemesi sebebiyle bu adımlara verdiği pasif yanıtlar, Japonya’nın gözünde ABD’yi misilleme yeteneğini sahip ama misilleme yapma niyeti olmayan bir statükocu devlet olarak konumlandırmıştır. Bu çalışma, ABD ve Japonya arasında savaşı başlatan Pearl Harbor saldırısına giden süreçte caydırıcılığın başarısızlığının temel nedenlerinin Japonya’nın statükodan memnuniyetsizliği ve Japonya’nın Amerikan inanılırlığına ilişkin sahip olduğu yanlış algı kalıpları olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak savaş, Japonya’nın gözünde kabul edilemez maliyetlerine rağmen daha kazançlı bir seçenek haline gelmiş ve caydırıcılık başarısız olmuştur. 

Keywords

• Caydırıcılık
• Washington Sistemi
• Algı
• Statüko

THE TESTING OF WASHINGTON SYSTEM WITH JAPANESE INITIATIVES AND THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE IN EAST ASIA

Abstract

The study aims to assess the Japanese challenge to the status quo established with the “Washington System” during the interwar period under the American leadership from the perspective of deterrence. Deterrence is based on cost/benefit calculations. When the cost of challenging the status quo is greater than the potential benefit, the challenger prefers to maintain the status quo. At this point, satisfaction with the status-quo and credibility are two determining factors of deterrence success and sustainability of the status quo. The changes in power asymmetry in East Asian regional order since the second half of 19 th century caused the fall of the Chinese Empire, the rise of Japan, and the opening of the regional states to Western-style international relations. However, the Washington system established under the US leadership after World War I (WWI) created a dissatisfied Japan with the status-quo in the region. As its capabilities increased, Japan began to take challenging initiatives shaking the Washington System. Due to the isolationist policy of the US after the WWI, US’ responses toward Japanese aggression were minimal and shied away. Thus, it made the US in the eyes of Japan as a status-quo power having retaliatory capacity but not the intention. This study shows that the main reasons for the deterrence failure on the road to the Pearl Harbor attack were the dissatisfaction of Japan with the status-quo and Japan’s misperception of American credibility. As a result, the war became a more beneficial option in Japan’s eyes despite its unacceptable costs, and deterrence failed.

Keywords

• Deterrence
• the Washington System
• Perception
• Status-Quo

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