Türkiye’de Askeri Yönetim Alanının Anayasal Dönüşümü: Anayasal İktisat Kuramı Çerçevesinde Bir İnceleme

Year 2020, Volume: 20 Issue: 2, 143 - 157, 20.11.2020

Ahmet Barbak

https://doi.org/10.25294/auiibfd.827475

Abstract

Bu makalenin amacı, Türkiye’de askeri yönetim alanının anayasal dönüşümünü kamu tercihi kuramları içinde yer alan Anayasal İktisat Kuramı çerçevesinde değerlendirmektir. Türkiye’de askeri yönetim alanı, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ile onun bağlı olduğu üst düzey karar alıcılardan oluşmakta; yasama, yürütme ve yargı erklerinin kesişme alanını oluşturmaktadır. Askeri yönetim alanında gerek siviller ve askerler gerekse yasama, yürütme ve yargı organları arasındaki kurumsal ilişkiler anayasada düzenlenmektedir. Anayasal İktisat Kuramının ana araştırma sorusu, silahlı kuvvetlerin gücünün anayasal temelde nasıl sınırlanacağıdır. Türkiye’de 1982’de yürürlüğe giren anayasa 1987’den itibaren on dokuz kez değiştirilmiştir. Bunlardan 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 ve 2017’de olanlar askeri yönetim alanı ile ilgilidir. Anayasa değişikliğinin askeri yönetim alanıyla ilgili düzenlemelerine genel olarak bakıldığında, yürütme organında yetki yoğunlaşması ve merkezileşmenin ortaya çıktığı, sivil yönetim ve yargı alanının genişlediği; askeri yönetim alanında sivillerin üstünlüğünde bir ilerleme olduğu ve askeri yargının sivil yargı lehine ortadan kalktığı görülmektedir.

Keywords

Askeri Yönetim Alanı, Anayasal İktisat, Anayasal Dönüşüm, Türkiye

Constitutional Transformation of Military Administrative Domain in Turkey: An Examination within the Framework of Constitutional Economics Theory

Abstract

This article aims to evaluate the constitutional transformation of military administrative domain in Turkey within the context of Constitutional Economics Theory which is included in the public choice theories. The military administrative domain in Turkey consists of the Turkish Armed Forces and its senior decision making bodies; it is the intersection area of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. Institutional relations between the civilians and military, as well as between the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the military administrative domain are primarily stipulated in the constitution. The main research question of Constitutional Economics Theory is how the power of the armed forces will be restricted on constitutional basis. Turkey’s current Constitution, which was put into force in 1982, has been amended nineteen times since 1987. Of these, those in 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2017 have been directly related to the military administrative domain. It is observed that constitutional amendments have resulted in the concentration of authority and centralization in the executive branch, expansion of civilian administration and jurisdiction, superiority of civilians in the military administrative domain, and the abolishment of military judiciary in favor of civilian judiciary.

Keywords

Military Administrative Domain, Constitutional Economics, Constitutional Transformation, Turkey

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